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The litigated cases are legion and the court decisions have been 
aptly vilified as a ‘jungle’ and a ‘viper’s tangle. . . .’  Exhaustive re-
search leaves one with the firm conviction that the courts are ap-
plying an amorphous and highly unsatisfactory ‘smell test.’ 
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In all but the most obvious cases, classifying shareholder loans as 
either debt or equity for federal income tax purposes is not an easy 
task.
2
  Courts and the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) have ap-
proached the classification issue by applying lists of multiple factors 
with little predictive value for taxpayers or other courts.
3
  Congress 
responded to this disappointing state of affairs in 1969 with the 
enactment of barebones statutory direction, most of which reflects 
the judicial factors
4
 and is of little value without interpretive regula-
tions.
5
  In the 1980s, the Department of the Treasury attempted to 
provide such regulatory direction, but it withdrew its proposals after 
several unsuccessful attempts.
6
 
 
 1 STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 140 (7th ed. 
2008) (citations omitted). 
 2 The debt/equity classification issue is often described as searching for a result 
along a continuum, for which one endpoint is debt, and the other is equity.  See, e.g., 
1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.02[1] (7th ed. 2000) (“‘[D]ebt’ and ‘equity’ are labels for the 
two edges of a spectrum.”); William J. Rands, The Closely Held Corporation: Its Capital 
Structure and the Federal Tax Laws, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1009, 1018–19 (1988) (“The prob-
lem is that the line of demarcation between what is debt and what is equity is simply 
unclear.  Between the classic versions of debt and equity is a continuum of interests 
that have aspects of both debt and equity.”) (citations omitted).  One can reasonably 
predict the outcome of factual situations that cluster around either endpoint, but the 
other points along the continuum produce unpredictable outcomes.  Despite the 
continuum nature of the inquiry, the ultimate result under a binary analysis is gener-
ally debt or equity, with no shading in between.  See, e.g., Paul Carman & Kelly Bend-
er, Debt, Equity or Other: Applying a Binary Analysis in a Multidimensional World, J. TAX’N, 
July 2007, at 17, 17.  There have been notable exceptions to this binary approach.  
For example, in 1989, Congress amended I.R.C. § 385 to authorize the Treasury to 
issue regulations that would bifurcate instruments into equity and debt portions, but 
those regulations have not been issued.  See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 18–29 and accompanying text. 
 4 See I.R.C. § 385 (2006); infra Part III.  As discussed in Part III, the statutory list 
of classification factors differs from the judicial approach because the Treasury is au-
thorized to issue regulations that bifurcate an instrument into “part stock and . . . 
part indebtedness.”  § 385(a).   
 5 In a relatively recent case, Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court did 
not bother to cite the applicable code provision, § 385, in the opinion.  See 85 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 940 (2003). 
 6 See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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Commentators have spent considerable effort analyzing the mass 
of judicial pronouncements.  Indeed, William T. Plumb, Jr., then a 
partner at Hogan & Hartson, published an exhaustive evaluation of 
the courts’ treatment of the classification factors in a 1971 article 
published in the Tax Law Review.
7
  The article was notable for, among 
other things, its length (271 pages) and detail (1591 footnotes).
8
  
Somewhat ironically, the introduction to the laborious Plumb article 
observed that “[t]his vexing subject has no doubt been written to 
death.”
9
  In that spirit, this Article will refer to the influential Plumb 
article from time to time to avoid repetition when references to the 
traditional multifactor classification doctrine are relevant.
10
 
Barring fundamental changes to the corporate taxation system 
that would render the debt/equity distinction irrelevant,
11
 this issue 
remains a continuing concern in corporate capitalization decisions.
12
  
 
 7 William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Crit-
ical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971). 
 8 See id. at 369, 640.  
 9 Id. at 371.   
 10 More than four decades after its publication, commentators and judges still 
cite the Plumb article.  See, e.g., Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365, 377 n.28 
(Ct. Cl. 1982); Gold Kist Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 696, 718 n.27 (1995); Steven A. 
Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 632 n.179 
(2008); Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA. TAX 
REV. 783, 790 n.21 (2008). See also infra note 24 (describing the continued relevance 
of the Plumb article and the little change in applicable doctrine in almost four dec-
ades). 
 11 See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.   
 12 The issue remains a concern because the deductibility of interest expense is 
the primary income tax benefit of debt classification.  The Jobs and Growth Tax Re-
lief Reconciliation Act of 2003, however, reduced the individual shareholder tax on 
dividend income to zero percent, five percent, and fifteen percent depending upon 
the taxpayer’s tax bracket and the year of receipt, as compared with interest income, 
which can be taxed at rates up to thirty-five percent.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Re-
conciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 105(a), 301(a)(1)–(2), 117 Stat. 752, 
755, 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (extended by the 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 
Stat. 345 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).  The re-
duced rate on dividends will expire for tax years beginning after December 31, 2010.  
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act § 101, 120 Stat. at 346.  Nevertheless, 
considering the corporation’s ability to deduct the interest (dividends are not de-
ductible), a lower combined federal income tax is still produced, in most cases, if the 
return on capital is paid in the form of interest rather than dividends.  See LIND ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 133 (“Even though most dividends now qualify for a preferential 
tax rate . . . they are still includible in a shareholder’s income and are not deductible 
by the  corporation. . . .  Assuming the owners of the business desire some ongoing 
return on their investment, there is an incentive to distribute earnings with tax-
deductible dollars.”). There are a number of other income tax consequences that 
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It remains of special importance to closely held businesses (including 
subsidiaries) that choose C corporation status despite the attractive-
ness of the limited liability company or S corporation.
13
  For public 
corporations, the broader search for “tax deductible equity” has 
pushed the limits of traditional debt classification doctrine.
14
 
This Article proposes the substitution of a hypothetical, arm’s 
length, third-party lender test for the multiple-factor classification 
test.  If a third-party lender acting at arm’s length would not make the 
 
turn on the debt/equity classification.  One is simplicity.  If the lender receives the 
face amount of the debt obligation (and if the adjusted basis of the obligation is 
equal to the face amount), the repayment is generally not a taxable event.  See I.R.C. 
§ 1271(a)(1) (2006).  If the redeemed corporate interest is instead equity, the com-
plex requirements of I.R.C. §§ 302–304 and 306 must be navigated.  Further, a loss 
on the worthlessness of stock or debt securities is generally treated differently from a 
loss on a debt obligation that is not a security.  See generally id. § 165(g)(1) (stating 
that the loss from the worthlessness of a security is “treated as a loss from the sale or 
exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset”); id. § 166(d)(1)(B) 
(stating that worthlessness of a nonbusiness debt is treated as a short term capital 
loss); id. § 1244(a) (stating that a loss on the worthlessness of certain small business 
stock is treated as an ordinary loss to a limited degree).  Courts have denied a bad 
debt deduction for shareholder advances.  See, e.g., In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1320 
(11th Cir. 1984); Lease v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121, 1129–30 (1993).  Section 
351 permits only the receipt of “stock” if the incorporation of appreciated assets is to 
be accomplished on an entirely tax-deferred basis.  § 351(a).   In the reorganization 
area, the receipt of debt in the form of “securities” as compared with stock produces 
different consequences in most cases.  See id. §§ 354, 356(d).  In both the incorpora-
tion and reorganization contexts, Congress has attempted to limit the use of certain 
types of preferred stock that functionally resemble debt.  See §§ 351(g), 
354(a)(2)(C), 356(e).  Only one economic class of stock is permitted in an S corpo-
ration.  Id. § 1361(b)(1)(D).  Consequently, there is a “straight debt safe harbor” 
available to avoid the risk that classifying debt as equity might produce a prohibited 
second class of stock.  See § 1361(c)(5).  This brief description of the consequences of 
debt/equity classification is not intended to be exhaustive.  For a more complete 
discussion, see 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4.01, 4.20–4.25.  The 
debt/equity classification issue is not confined to corporations and arises in other 
taxation contexts.  See generally Carman & Bender, supra note 2, at 24 (in part discuss-
ing a partnership taxation case). 
 13 The taxable income and losses of limited liability companies and S corpora-
tions are passed to their owners, such that the entity generally is not subject to feder-
al income taxes.  See I.R.C. §§ 701 (partners, but not the partnership, are subject to 
the income tax), 1363(a) (S corporation generally not subject to the income tax), 
1366 (passthrough of items of income, loss, deduction, or credit to S corporation 
shareholders).  An S corporation, however, may be required to pay income taxes in 
certain limited circumstances.  See id. §§ 1374–1375.  A subsidiary of a C corporation 
cannot generally elect S corporation status.  See id. § 1361(b)(1)(B).   
 14 See Thomas A. Humphreys, Tax Deductible Equity: The Quest for the Holy Grail—
Part II, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, 
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, 1125, 1217–18 
(2008). 
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capital infusion as a loan, then the presumptive classification is equi-
ty.  This proposal would simplify and focus the classification doctrine.  
Although third-party willingness to lend funds is already one of the 
factors considered by courts,
15
 this Article suggests that it should be 
the predominant factor.  No court or commentator has expressly 
adopted this proposed approach.  The third-party lender test is a 
more coherent doctrinal solution to the debt/equity classification is-
sue as applied to shareholder loans of closely held corporations.
16
  It 
is an incomplete answer, however, to the broader issues presented by 
the “debt” of public corporations with ready access to public capital 
markets and more options in satisfying their capital requirements.
17
 
Part II of this Article briefly describes the courts’ application of 
the multifactor classification test.  Part III succinctly discusses the sta-
tutory and administrative responses to the classification issue.  Part IV 
provides an overview of the proposed third-party lender test and as-
sesses its claimed benefits.  Part V evaluates potential objections to its 
adoption.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE JUDICIAL MULTIPLE-FACTOR CLASSIFICATION TEST 
To assess whether capital infusions are debt or equity, courts 
generally apply a list of factors to a taxpayer’s circumstances to de-
termine whether the capital contributor is assuming the risks and 
seeking the rewards of a creditor or those of an owner of a corpora-
tion.
18
  The factors are not of equal weight and no single factor is de-
 
 15 See, e.g., Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 943–44 (2003). 
 16 See infra Part II.  Practitioners continue to publish articles discussing the 
debt/equity classification factors.  See generally, e.g., Sharon Burnett & Darlene Pul-
liam Smith, Debt or Equity? The Current Status of Section 385, 71 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 
77 (2003); Carman & Bender, supra note 2; Humphreys, supra note 14.  Contra David 
A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
1627, 1627 (1999) (“[T]ax academics generally do not write serious articles on doc-
trinal issues.  For example, since William Plumb summarized the case law on the dif-
ference between debt and equity in 1971, no one has touched the subject.”)  
 17 See infra Part V.D. 
 18 Income tax law is replete with multifactor tests, many of which are judicial cre-
ations.  See, e.g., United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 909–12 (5th Cir. 1969) (ap-
plying seven judicially created factors to determine that land was held primarily for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and therefore not a capital as-
set); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) (listing nine factors used in determining wheth-
er an activity is engaged in for profit).  Assessing the reasonableness of compensation 
of corporate employees (as compared with constructive dividend treatment) also in-
volves a multiple-factor approach.  See generally Melanie G. McCoskey, Reasonable Com-
pensation: Do You Know Where Your Circuit Stands?, J. TAX’N, Oct. 2008, at 228.  The 
reasonableness of compensation and the classification of debt share a common tax 
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terminative.
19
  Consequently, courts exercise broad discretion in ap-
plying the test.
20
 
In Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States,
21
 a well-known and fairly rep-
resentative case,
22
 the court applied sixteen factors to determine the 
nature of a capital contribution: 
(1) the intent of the parties; (2) the identity between creditors 
and shareholders; (3) the extent of participation in management 
by the holder of the instrument; (4) the ability of the corporation 
to obtain funds from outside sources; (5) the “thinness” of the 
capital structure in relation to debt; (6) the risk involved; (7) the 
formal indicia of the arrangement; (8) the relative position of the 
obligees as to other creditors regarding the payment of interest 
and principal; (9) the voting power of the holder of the instru-
ment; (10) the provision of a fixed rate of interest; (11) a contin-
gency on the obligation to repay; (12) the source of the interest 
payments; (13) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; 
(14) a provision for redemption by the corporation; (15) a provi-
sion for redemption at the option of the holder; and (16) the tim-
 
structural thread as both are means to distribute corporate wealth in a tax deductible 
fashion.  Perhaps one of the most pervasive—yet ultimately impotent—multifactor 
tests was announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Morrisey v. Commis-
sioner, in which the Court sought to classify entities as associations taxable as a corpo-
ration, partnership, or trust by weighing at least eight corporate characteristics.  296 
U.S. 344, 360–62 (1935).  The corporate characteristics test was largely abolished by 
the so-called “check-the-box” regulations adopted in 1997.  See Treas. Reg. 
§§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-4 (as amended in 2009).  Problems distinguishing “debt” 
from “equity” are not confined to the tax area and also appear in the bankruptcy 
treatment of shareholder or insider “loans” to undercapitalized corporations.  See 
generally 1 NANCY C. DREHER & JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL §6:61 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
 19 See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946) (“There is no 
one characteristic, not even exclusion from management, which can be said to be 
decisive in the determination of whether the obligations are risk investments in the 
corporations or debts.”); J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 451, 456–57 (8th 
Cir. 1967) (“These indicia have varying degrees of relevancy, depending on the par-
ticular factual situation and are generally not all applicable to any given case.”).  
 20 There is a split of authority as to whether the debt/equity characterization is a 
question of law or fact.  See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 21 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 22 Although each Court of Appeals generally follows its own list of factors when 
deciding this issue, the courts’ approaches are generally similar.  See, e.g., Roth Steel 
Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F. 2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying an eleven-factor 
test); Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F. 2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985) (following an eleven-
factor test); Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 1984) (adopt-
ing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s thirteen-factor test); J.S. Biritz 
Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying a ten-factor test).  
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ing of the advance with reference to the organization of the cor-
poration.
23
 
The factors have not evolved much in the four decades since Fin 
Hay Realty Co.
24
  In Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
25
 a recent U.S. 
Tax Court memorandum decision, the court applied eight general 
factors, some of which had multiple parts: (1) thin or adequate capi-
talization, with an emphasis on debt-to-equity ratios (the fifth factor 
of Fin Hay Realty Co.); (2) “[e]xtent to [w]hich [f]unds [w]ere [u]sed 
[t]o [a]cquire [c]apital [a]ssets” (the sixteenth factor of Fin Hay Real-
ty Co.); (3) proportionality of  stock ownership to creditor interests 
(the second factor of Fin Hay Realty Co.); (4) risk, which examines the 
unconditional nature of the obligation to repay and payments that 
were not dependent on profits or excused in the event of losses (the 
eleventh factor of Fin Hay Realty Co.); (5) third-party loans, meaning 
whether loans were available from outside creditors (the fourth factor 
of Fin Hay Realty Co.); (6) management participation (the ninth fac-
tor of Fin Hay Realty Co.); (7) payments made when due; and (8) in-
tent of the parties, with reference to the presence of fixed dates for 
payments and the lenders’ understanding and knowledge of the cor-
 
 23 Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 696.   
 24 See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 49 (2009) (“Be-
cause so little has changed doctrinally since the [Plumb] article was published and 
the prospects for any sort of intellectual breakthrough appear too poor to encourage 
would-be successors, this article . . . remains the gold standard of debt-equity analysis 
despite its extreme antiquity as secondary legal sources go.”); Burnett & Smith, supra 
note 16, at 85 (“Despite the fact that this statement [from Fin Hay Realty Co.] was writ-
ten 35 years ago, the current state of the debt vs. equity question remains the 
same.”).  A 2002 Field Service Advisory identified twelve familiar factors drawn from 
case law:  
(1) the name and presence of a written agreement demonstrating in-
debtedness; (2) the presence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source of 
payments, e.g., whether there is anticipated cash flow to cover pay-
ments; (4) the right to enforce payment; (5) increased participation in 
management as the result of the advance; (6) subordination; (7) thin-
ness of the capital structure in relation to debt; (8) the identity of in-
terest between the creditor and stockholder; (9) the source of interest 
payments, e.g., from earnings; (10) the ability of the corporation to ob-
tain credit from outside sources; (11) the use of funds for capital assets 
or risk involved in making the advances; and (12) the failure of the 
debtor to repay.   
I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200205031, at 3 (Nov. 1, 2001) (line breaks and citations 
omitted). 
 25 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940 (2003). 
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poration’s business and a reasonable expectation of its likely success 
(the first, seventh, and thirteenth factors of Fin Hay Realty Co.).
26
 
In the context of a closely held corporation, in which the over-
whelming majority of reported cases arise,
27
 thin capitalization is a 
particularly important factor.
28
  Some of the factors, such as incom-
plete documentation of the loan, are pitfalls primarily for careless or 
uninformed taxpayers and can be easily satisfied with little inconve-
nience.
29
 
III. THE STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE 
CLASSIFICATION ISSUE 
In the years leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the prob-
lems of classifying corporate capital infusions produced demands for 
 
 26 Id. at 943–44; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696.  In Delta Plastics, Inc., the 
court applied the factors that it deemed relevant from a list of ten factors used by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to which an appeal of the case would 
lie.  Delta Plastics, Inc., 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 943 (citing In re Uneco, 532 F.2d 1204, 
1208 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 27 Cf. Paul J. Robertson et al., Debt or Equity? An Empirical Analysis of Tax Court 
Classification During the Period 1955-1987, 47 TAX NOTES 707, 715 (1990) (“The case 
law, concerned largely with investment in closely held corporations, classifies an in-
terest in a corporation on the basis of a long list of characteristics whose weight, 
number, and importance may vary somewhat from court to court.”).   
 28 See Plumb, supra note 7, at 512–13. 
     In recent years, the courts . . . have placed the debt-equity ratio in 
perspective, as not requiring nonrecognition as a matter of law . . . but 
as one of the significant factors bearing on the reasonableness of the 
expectation of repayment, reflecting the extent of the cushion by 
which the purported creditors are shielded against the effects of busi-
ness losses and declines in property values.   
Id. at 512–13 (citations omitted).  The Robertson empirical study found that seven 
variables “correctly classified, as debt or equity, 96.7 percent of the Tax Court cases.”  
See Robertson et al., supra note 27, at 714.  The factors, in rank order of importance, 
were (1) repayment from uncertain profits; (2) whether rights were enforced; (3) 
debt/equity ratio; (4) independent sources of credit; (5) formal documentation; (6) 
subordination; and (7) presence of a sinking fund.  See id. at 715.  Although propor-
tionality in holdings of debt and equity was not identified by Robertson as one of the 
highly discriminative factors, descriptive commentators consider it to be a significant 
factor.  “Although it is not fatal per se to debt classification, the fact that debt is 
owned in proportion to stockholdings tends to poison the atmosphere and to invite 
special scrutiny by the courts.”  1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 2, ¶ 4.04[2].  Howev-
er, proportionate holdings of stock and debt played a central role in the Treasury’s 
approach to regulations interpreting I.R.C. § 385, discussed infra Part III.  See generally 
Jack S. Levin & Stephen S. Bowen, The Section 385 Regulations Regarding Debt Versus 
Equity: Is the Cure Worse than the Malady?, 35 TAX LAW. 1, 2–39 (1981) (discussing the 
promulgation of the regulations and the importance of proportionality). 
 29 See Plumb, supra note 7, at 461–62. 
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more certainty in the law.  In 1954, the American Law Institute pro-
posed safe harbor rules of classification, and the American Bar Asso-
ciation weighed in as well.
30
  Ultimately, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
added I.R.C. § 385 to the Code, which, although not a safe harbor, 
presented a non-exclusive list of factors drawn from those applied by 
the courts.
31
 
Section 385 provides that regulations shall set forth factors to be 
taken into account in classifying corporate capital infusions as debt or 
equity, and that 
[those factors] may include among other factors: (1) whether 
there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on 
a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate 
consideration in money or money’s worth, and to pay a fixed rate 
of interest, (2) whether there is subordination to or preference 
over any indebtedness of the corporation, (3) the ratio of debt to 
equity of the corporation, (4) whether there is convertibility into 
the stock of the corporation, and (5) the relationship between 
holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the interest 
in question.
32
 
 In 1989, Congress amended § 385 to provide that the regula-
tions can prescribe rules which treat instruments “as in part stock or 
in part indebtedness,” a break with the all or nothing judicial ap-
proach to classification.
33
  Three years later, Congress revisited § 385 
and provided that the issuer’s characterization of an instrument as 
 
 30 See id. at 579–88 (discussing proposals leading up to the adoption of I.R.C. 
§ 385). 
 31 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(b), 83 Stat. 487, 613 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 385 (2006)). 
 32 I.R.C. § 385(b) (2006) (line breaks omitted). 
 33 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 
§ 7208(a)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2337 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 385(a) (2006)).  
Two courts had bifurcated a hybrid instrument into debt and equity components, but 
those decisions are aberrations.  See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. 
v. Comm’r, 528 F.2d 917, 920 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that “hybrid securities may be 
treated either as debt or equity, depending upon the circumstances “ and that for the 
hybrids, interest deductions are permitted for guaranteed dividend payments, but 
that other amounts are treated as equity); Farley Realty Corp. v. Comm’r, 279 F.2d 
701, 704 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that “an individual investor may occupy dual statuses 
of stockholder and creditor in relation to a corporation . . . even though the two 
types of investments occur simultaneously”).  Some commentators have criticized a 
wholesale bifurcation approach as potentially leading to tax abuse “because corpora-
tions simply would treat all instruments as debt until the Commissioner challenged 
the characterization.”  Margaret A. Gibson, Comment, The Intractable Debt/Equity 
Problem: A New Structure for Analyzing Shareholder Advances, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 452, 461 
(1987). 
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stock or debt at the time of issuance is binding on the issuer and the 
holders of such instrument, but not on the Service.
34
 
With the exception of the bifurcation concept introduced in the 
1989 amendments, the statute adds little to the longstanding judicial 
classification doctrine.  Consequently, the application of § 385 is 
highly dependent on the issuance of regulations, and the statute in-
vites the Treasury to promulgate them.
35
  To its credit, the Treasury 
made several efforts from 1980 to 1983 to issue final regulations but 
failed to adopt them in the end.
36
 
Unlike the narrow focus of the test proposed by this Article, the 
regulations attempted to answer the debt/equity riddle for both 
closely held and public corporations.
37
  One hallmark of the regula-
tions was their attempt to inject a degree of certainty by establishing 
several bright line rules.
38
  Commentators carefully analyzed and cri-
 
 34 See § 385(c)(1).  Subsection (c) of § 385 was added by the Energy Policy Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1936(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3032.  Subject to exceptions in 
regulations, if the holder of an instrument discloses a characterization inconsistent 
with that of the issuer on his return, the holder is not bound by the issuer’s characte-
rization.  See I.R.C. § 385(c)(2).   
 35 See I.R.C. § 385(a). 
 36 The Treasury issued the first proposed regulations in March 1980.  See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1 to 1.385-12, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18957–73 (Mar. 24, 1980).   
The March 1980 proposed regulations, as revised, were filed with the Federal Regis-
ter on December 29, 1980, and published in the Federal Register as final regulations 
on December 31, 1980, effective for interests created after April 30, 1980.  See T.D. 
7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141.  This Article follows the convention of most writers in refer-
ring to the regulations as the December 31, 1980, regulations.  On May 1, 1981, the 
effective date of the regulations was postponed to January 1, 1982.  See T.D. 7774, 
1981-1 C.B. 168.  The effective date was again postponed to July 1, 1982.  See T.D. 
7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60.  On January 5, 1982, the Treasury issued proposed regulations 
that amended and restated the December 31, 1980, regulations.  See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.385-0 to 1.385-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 170, 170–87 (Jan. 5, 1982).  The effective 
date was then postponed again to the later of “90 days after the publication of the 
final revisions to the regulations or January 1, 1983.”  T.D. 7822, 1982-2 C.B. 84.  On 
July 6, 1983, the Treasury published a notice of proposed withdrawal of the Decem-
ber 31, 1980, regulations.  See 48 Fed. Reg. 31053, 31053 (July 6, 1983).  The regula-
tions project was ultimately withdrawn, effective August 5, 1983, with the publication 
of Treasury Decision 7920 on November 3, 1983.  See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69.   
 37 Richard L. Kaplan & Lowell D. Yoder, New Variations on an Old Enigma: The 
Treasury Department’s Debt-Equity Regulations, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 567, 585.   
 38 See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18971 (Mar. 24, 1980).  
For example, the March 1980 proposed regulations treated any instrument issued by 
a corporation as stock if the debt-to-equity ratio of the issuing corporation was great-
er than ten to one immediately after the instrument was issued and at the end of the 
taxable year that it was issued.  Id.  That approach was obviously flawed because it did 
not account for the borrower’s overall business prospects or the customary capital 
structures across industries.  The December 31, 1980, proposed regulations con-
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tiqued the multiple waves of proposals.
39
  None of the interested par-
ties was fully satisfied with the regulations,
40
 and the Treasury with-
drew the proposals in 1983.
41
  The Treasury has apparently 
doned this project.
42
 
IV. INVIGORATING THE THIRD-PARTY LENDER TEST 
A. A Simpler and More Coherent Solution 
As discussed in Part II, the conventional judicial approach to the 
debt/equity classification issue is to consider a list of unequally 
weighted resemblance factors.  In resolving the issue of whether 
shareholder salaries are “a reasonable allowance,”
43
 the courts follow 
a similar route.
44
  In Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, however, 
 
verted this rule to a two-part safe harbor, where straight debt instruments would not 
be reclassified if the corporation’s “outside” debt-to-equity ratio did not exceed ten 
to one, and the ratio of insider debt to equity did not exceed three to one.  See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f), 45 Fed. Reg. 86438, 86441 (Dec. 31, 1980); T.D. 7747, 1981-
1 C.B. 141, 160. 
 39 See, e.g., Kaplan & Yoder, supra note 37; Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law 
of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9 (1982); William 
Natbony, Cleaning the Augean Stables: The Debt-Equity Regulations, 8 J. CORP. TAX’N 185 
(1981) (comparing the March 24, 1980, regulations and the December 31, 1980, fi-
nal regulations); Lawrence M. Stone & C. Kevin McGeehan, Distinguishing Corporate 
Debt from Stock Under Section 385, 36 TAX. L. REV. 341 (1981).  
 40 The small business community was reportedly unhappy with the proposed reg-
ulations.  See infra note 174.  In addition, it appeared that the certainty provided to 
public corporations would permit them to create instruments that abused the regula-
tions, which alarmed the Treasury.  See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influ-
ence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the United States: 1981–1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 
119, 161 (1997). 
 41 See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69. 
 42 See, e.g., LIND ET AL., supra note 1, at 152  (“[T]he Treasury is unlikely to initiate 
the mobilization that would be required to resurrect this project.”); Humphreys, su-
pra note 14, at 1244 (“Even mentioning revisiting Code section 385 regulations, how-
ever, is likely to be ‘dead on arrival’ in Washington D.C. [sic] parlance.”).  These ex-
amples are representative of a common observation.  As has been the case for many 
years, § 385 regulations are not listed in the priority guidance plan projects for cor-
porations and their shareholders.  See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY AND I.R.S., I.R.S., UPDATE 
TO 2007–2008 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2008), available at 2008 WL 4287826. 
 43 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business, including, . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other 
compensation for personal services actually rendered. . . .”).   
 44 See, e.g., Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949).  The 
court considered the following factors to determine that the compensation paid to 
the employees at issue was reasonable:  
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Judge Posner parted with the prevailing multifactor analysis and ap-
plied an independent investor test in determining whether the 
shareholders could still earn a market return on the corporation’s 
equity.
45
  In effect, Posner’s economic analysis split the profits of the 
corporation between the service provider and the capital providers.
46
 
This Article similarly proposes a more direct approach to the 
debt classification question that would supplant the judicial multifac-
tor test as applied to shareholder loans.  As discussed in Part II, the 
availability of third-party loans has been one of the many factors al-
ready applied by the courts.  This Article proposes that it should be 
the principal test applied to shareholder loans in closely held corpo-
rations, including parent-subsidiary and otherwise affiliated
47
 struc-
tures.  The test could be applied to some of the financing features of 
publicly traded corporations, but as discussed in Part V, it would be 
 
the employee’s qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the em-
ployee’s work; the size and complexities of the business; a comparison 
of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income; the prevail-
ing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries with distribu-
tions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for compa-
rable positions in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the 
taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of small corporations with 
a limited number of officers the amount of compensation paid to the 
particular employee in previous years.  
Id.  This 1949 opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is generally 
cited as the doctrinal foundation of the multiple-factor test in this area.  See 
McCoskey, supra note 18, at 230. 
 45 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838–39 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 46 In prior cases, courts evaluating the reasonableness of compensation paid to 
shareholder employees had considered the issue “from the perspective of a hypothet-
ical independent investor” and appropriate returns on equity.  See, e.g., Elliots, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983); Diverse Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 
T.C.M. (CCH) 525, 532–34 (1986).  Consequently, Exacto Spring Corp. is notable not 
for pioneering those concepts, but in applying them as the sole classification crite-
rion in creating a presumption of a reasonable salary.  As explained at length in Me-
nard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2009), the presumption can be 
rebutted by evidence, including “that the company’s success was the result of extra-
neous factors, . . . that the employee does no work for the corporation, . . . [or] evi-
dence of a conflict of interest.”  The Exacto Spring Corp. approach is a market-based 
approach, as it employs an estimated rate of return demanded by independent inves-
tors.  Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 838–39.  Establishing that market rate of return 
for a particular company makes application of the test dependent on expert witness 
analyses of those factors. 
 47 See, e.g., Tex. Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that advances between affiliated nonprofit corporations were contributions 
to capital, not loans); Cerand & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 755, 759 
(2001) (holding that advances to brother-sister corporations were contributions to 
capital and not loans). 
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an incomplete solution due to public corporations’ numerous and 
more nuanced alternatives for raising capital.  The proposed test 
would be adopted as a regulation through an exercise of the Trea-
sury’s authority under § 385.
48
 
This Article proposes the following test: if a third-party lender, 
acting at arm’s length and with reasonable knowledge of all relevant 
facts existing at the time the transaction is consummated,
49
 would not 
make the loan
50
 in substantially
51
 the same manner in which it was 
 
 48 See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 49 This portion of the test draws from the established definition of fair market 
value for estate tax purposes, which “is the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”  Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).  This is a challenge, inasmuch as share-
holders and third-party lenders may not otherwise have access to the same informa-
tion about the corporate borrower.  See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.  As 
discussed later, the phrase “existing at the time the transaction is consummated” can 
be applied later in certain situations, such as a demand loan or upon extension or 
renegotiation of the loan.  See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 50 One might claim that there is a tautological flaw in this test, as the test for a 
“debt” analyzes whether a hypothetical third party would “lend” money to the bor-
rower on the same terms and conditions.  There are several responses to this that 
have the most force in the closely held business context.  First, the taxpayer will have 
identified the transaction as a “loan” in its tax treatment of the capital infusion.  As 
so denominated, the test is whether a third party would accept such instrument in 
exchange for its cash.  If the “loan” so labeled by the taxpayer is in substance equity, 
particularly because it requires the lender to assume uncustomary risks of the busi-
ness, then a lender would not make the investment in that manner.  To ensure that 
the third-party lender may not be acting as an equity investor, the test incorporates 
some aspects of a “straight debt” instrument.  Second, as discussed in the text ac-
companying infra notes 91–98, the courts, in considering an aspect of this test as part 
of the multiple-factor tests, have not been reluctant to entertain testimony couched 
in this fashion.  Third, the proposed arm’s length test, while focusing on the risk a 
third-party lender would assess, also includes some of the more formalistic factors 
that have traditionally separated debt from equity (such as a written unconditional 
promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return 
for an adequate consideration in money or money’s worth, and to pay a fixed rate of 
interest) and those factors inject a traditional debt flavor.  Fourth, and this is admit-
tedly the least satisfactory response, the definition of “debt” in an income tax sense 
resembles the income tax’s definition of  “gift.”  Commissioner v. Duberstein offered no 
definitions and relegated the inquiry to a question of fact.  363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).  
Likewise, the Court’s leading pronouncement about the debt classification issue, John 
Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946), offered little definition beyond a 
multifactor “smell test” of equity resemblance that the courts continue to apply to-
day, albeit after dutifully reciting the applicable multiple-factor test.  Perhaps the 
debt classification issue invokes a meaning of debt in a financial sense akin to the 
“more colloquial sense” of a gift definition.  See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.  Accor-
dingly, although the rigor of the proposed test is diminished to a degree, overall 
courts should still be able to employ it to aid better decision making.  The December 
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structured,
52
 then the presumptive classification
53
 is equity.  The hypo-
thetical third-party lender could include any lenders appropriate to 
 
31, 1980, regulations applied a commercial lender standard to determine whether 
debt was excessive (a related but more limited inquiry) that sidestepped the tautolo-
gy by referring to whether the instrument and the borrower’s structure “would not 
be satisfactory to a bank, insurance company or similar lending institution which 
makes ordinary commercial loans.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 
86438, 86453 (Dec. 31, 1980).  The proposed test could be cleverly restated in this 
manner but this Article has declined to do that for the sake of simplicity. 
 51 The proposed test employs “substantial” comparability to contribute to flexibil-
ity in application.  In comparison, § 482’s arm’s length standard also can consist of 
values within a range of comparables.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(2)(ii)–(iii) (as 
amended in 2009); cf. I.R.C. § 465(b)(6)(D)(ii) (2006) (exempting certain related-
party financing if it “is commercially reasonable and on substantially the same terms 
as loans involving unrelated persons”). 
 52 Much like the courts’ current treatment of the debt classification issue, which 
examines all of the facts and circumstances of the purported debt, the proposed 
arm’s length standard would still examine all of the borrower’s factors in determin-
ing whether outside financing on the same terms would be available.   
[A]nalysis of the corporation’s ability to secure outside financing does 
not necessarily provide insight into the nature of the shareholder ad-
vance.  Although in some cases the inability of a company to secure 
outside financing will reflect that such an advance involves excessive fi-
nancial risk, this factor is not sufficiently predictive of the nature of the 
underlying loan.  In assessing its willingness to provide financing to a 
company, a lending institution considers too many extraneous factors 
to warrant using traditional lending institutions as a benchmark for 
distinguishing debt and equity for tax purposes.  For example, the 
“perceived integrity of the borrower plays a primary role in a compa-
ny’s ability to obtain financing from commercial lending institutions.” 
Such subjective criteria should not play a role in the federal tax 
debt/equity distinction. 
Gibson, supra note 33, at 488–89 (citation omitted). 
 53 The presumptive classification is equity, but that can be overcome by proof to 
the contrary.  There is, however, always an information asymmetry between taxpayers 
and the Service when the facts concern what the taxpayer did or did not do, such 
that taxpayers have the edge.  The proposed test’s presumption would encourage 
taxpayers, in their self-interest, to document the third-party lender factors, to consid-
er them in deal making, and to produce that evidence in litigation.  The presump-
tion would be rebuttable, permitting a court to examine other factors.  There is the 
obvious risk that this exception could swallow the rule, particularly in light of the 
courts’ longstanding adherence to the multiple factor approach.  This approach, 
however, is necessary to inject some flexibility into a difficult area of the law.  This 
presumption in favor of the government could contravene the burden shifting rule 
of § 7491(a), as that section deals with “evidence with respect to any factual issue,” 
and the proposed test should be construed as an issue of fact.  I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1); see 
infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.  Although this Article envisions that the 
proposed test would be applied through regulations, if necessary § 7491(a)(3) yields 
when “any other provision of this title provides for a specific burden of proof with 
respect to such issue.”  In that event, a statutory revision to § 385 adopting the pro-
posed test would be helpful.  Empirical studies of Tax Court decisions have generally 
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the particular borrower, such as private “angel” investors,
54
 venture 
capital investors,
55
 commercial banks,
56
 credit unions,
57
 or public fi-
 
found no impact from the adoption of § 7491 in overall Tax Court litigation not con-
fined to the debt/equity issue.  See, e.g., Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empiri-
cal Study of the Change in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 PITT. TAX 
REV. 61, 81 (2008) (“Overall, the change in the burden of proof in the Act did not 
have a statistically significant effect on those cases decided within the Tax Court 
when the taxpayer was an individual.”). 
 54 See Adrian Wooldridge, Global Heroes, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 3, 5.   
Venture capitalists fund only a small fraction of start-ups.  The money 
for the vast majority comes from personal debt or from the “three fs”—
friends, fools and families. . . .  
     Monitor, a management consultancy that has recently conducted an 
extensive survey of entrepreneurs, emphasises the importance of “an-
gel” investors, who operate somewhere in the middle ground between 
venture capitalists and family and friends.  They usually have some per-
sonal connection with their chosen entrepreneur and are more likely 
than venture capitalists to invest in a business when it is little more 
than a budding idea.   
Id. at 4.  One overview of the leading studies of angel investing found that between 
250,000 and 300,000 angel investors are active each year with an annual investment 
that ranges between twenty and thirty billion dollars.  See GERALD A. BENJAMIN & JOEL 
MARGULIS, ANGEL FINANCING: HOW TO FIND AND INVEST IN PRIVATE EQUITY 77 (2000).  A 
simple profile of angel investors would be people who have likely owned and sold 
their own businesses and are private, affluent citizens particularly interested in early 
stage deals.  Id. at 83–84.  In fact, “as venture capital is the real contributor to later-
stage deals, angel capital has become the indubitable contributor to early-stage deals, 
the resource for the majority of companies.”  Id. at 69.  
 55 See STEPHEN BLOOMFIELD, VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
RAISING FINANCE 44 (2d ed. 2008).  The purpose of venture capitalism (VC) “is to 
make a substantial rate of return to both the investor and the entrepreneur(s) within 
a reasonably closely defined time, typically three to five years, by enhancing the capi-
tal value of the business in which the investment is made.”  Id.  VC does not ensure a 
return, however, as “[s]even out of 10 companies in the average VC’s portfolio will 
either fold or be sold at a loss to investors.”  JOEL CARDIS ET AL., VENTURE CAPITALISM: 
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND PRACTITIONERS 14 (2001).  
One company, on average, of those ten will have a 1000 percent return either 
through a successful IPO or acquisition.  Id.  VC makes only a small percentage of 
start-up financing, as venture capitalists tend to “reject about ninety-nine percent of 
the business plans that come to them.”  Id. at 11.  The law firm Fenwick & West stu-
died the trends of VC in Silicon Valley and found that in the first quarter of 2009, the 
amount invested by venture capitalists was $3.8 billion on 470 deals throughout the 
United States, a decline from the $5.9 billion invested on 590 deals in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and the $7.3 billion invested on 680 deals in the first quarter of 2008.  
FENWICK & WEST LLP, TRENDS IN TERMS OF VENTURE FINANCINGS IN SILICON VALLEY 1 
(2009), available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/VCSurvey/Q109_VC_Terms_ 
Survey_Report.pdf.  Producing a yearly figure from these numbers shows how little 
financing comes from VC as compared to the numbers for angel financing.  This is 
especially true considering that 400,000 to 500,000 companies are aggressively seek-
ing financing at any given time.  See BENJAMIN & MARGULIS, supra note 54, at 77.  In 
Adelson v. United States, the court found that a business consultant’s short-term ad-
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nancial markets.
58
  The hypothetical lender would own no other in-
terest in the borrowing corporation,
59
 nor would she have any non-
 
vances to start-up companies seeking to go public were debt for income tax purposes 
when the consultant sought to claim a bad debt deduction.  737 F.2d 1569, 1573, 
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  “A factor that is particularly significant in this case is that tax-
payer had at best a minor equity interest in the client-companies.  It is clear from the 
facts that, with the possible exception of [one company], taxpayer was dealing with 
the client-companies as an ‘outsider. . . .’”  Id. at 1572.  The government had tried to 
characterize the relationship as that of a “venture capitalist,” which it apparently 
equated with an equity investor.  See id. 
 56 This would include loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).  The SBA 7(a) Loan Program is the typical loan guaranteed by the SBA, and 
these loans are provided and administered by commercial lenders.  See Small Bus. 
Admin., 7(a) Loan Program, http://www.sba.gov/financialassistance/borrowers/ 
guaranteed/7alp/index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  Thus, in order to obtain one 
of these loans, the small business owner goes to the commercial lender, and the 
lender decides if it will make the loan internally or if the application has weaknesses 
that will require an SBA guaranty on a portion of the loan.  Id.  The lenders must 
choose to structure their loans by the SBA’s requirements and then apply to receive a 
guaranty from the SBA.  Id.  Then, if the lender is able to receive an SBA guaranty, 
the applicant must meet SBA-mandated size standards, be for profit, not already have 
the internal resources to provide the financing, and be able to demonstrate repay-
ment.  Id. 
 57 Reportedly, approximately twenty-seven percent of credit unions offer business 
loans, with an average loan size of approximately $215,000.  See Jilian Mincer, Small 
Businesses Find a New Source for Funding, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, at B7.  In fact, some 
believe that credit unions need to offer this sort of member business lending in or-
der to survive.  See David Winsheimer, New Territory, CREDIT UNION MGMT., June 2008, 
at 46, 46 (2008), available at 2008 WLNR 11872339.  One example is Synergy One 
FCU, which had thirty small business loans valued at $11 million in 2008.  Id. at 47. 
 58 The December 31, 1980, regulations considered whether a corporation’s debt 
was excessive, in which case the instrument would be treated as stock.   
The corporation’s debt is “excessive” if (i) all of the instrument’s terms 
and conditions and (ii) the corporation’s financial structure, taken to-
gether, would not be satisfactory to a bank, insurance company or simi-
lar lending institution which makes ordinary commercial loans.  For 
this purpose, the corporation’s size, industry, geographic location, and 
financial condition must be taken into account.   
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 86438, 86453 (Dec. 31, 1980).  The 
test proposed by this Article is broader in terms of the types of hypothetical lenders 
that are allowed, but the regulations’ broad weighing of the borrower’s factors is 
helpful. 
 59 The December 31, 1980, regulations included an independent creditor safe 
harbor test.  A creditor was deemed to be independent if stock owned by the corpo-
rate borrower would not be attributed to the creditor under modified § 318 attribu-
tion rules and the creditor’s holdings of stock and instruments were “not substantial-
ly proportionate.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2)(ii), 45 Fed. Reg. at 86452 (Dec. 
31, 1980).  Essentially, the creditor could not own five percent or more of the corpo-
rate borrower.  
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creditor relationship,
60
 with limited exceptions.
61
  In the interest of 
simplicity, this would focus the inquiry on the lending relationship, 
distinct from any current or potential investing relationships, includ-
ing warrants or convertibility options.
62
  Although the determination 
of the debt portion would be made without reference to those equity 
attributes, the test could be softened a bit by permitting the bifurca-
 
 60 The January 5, 1982, proposed regulations included consideration of 
“[w]hether the creditor has a relationship with the corporation other than that of a 
creditor, e.g., as an employee, supplier, or customer.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-
6(b)(1)(ii), 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 180 (Jan. 5, 1982). 
 61 One exception to the proposed third-party lender test would exempt promis-
sory notes of a corporation payable to a redeemed shareholder in a transaction that 
qualifies for sale or exchange treatment under §§ 302 and 303.  The exception would 
be based on pragmatic considerations (as this is often the most practical means of 
exit from a closely held corporation) and in recognition of the reduced potential for 
abuse due to the nonrecurring and relatively short-term nature of the transaction.   
 62 A warrant or convertible option to purchase shares in the borrower would be 
ignored, recognizing that this would potentially impact a hypothetical third-party 
lender’s incentives and decision whether to extend the loan.  Indeed, many of these 
relationships demonstrate a sliding scale of attributes from lender to investor, based 
on interest rates, security for the loan, priority, convertibility, and so forth.   
As lenders have contemplated inflation and the growth in the value of 
real estate and some other equities, they have increasingly sought to 
share in the earnings and appreciation that historically inured exclu-
sively to the benefit of the borrower’s shareholders.  Conversely, even 
in a high-risk financial environment, some entrepreneurial investors 
have attempted to cut their exposure by bargaining for some of the 
protections that have traditionally been the hallmarks of the lender.  
To satisfy these conflicting appetites for risk and security, financial 
planners have devised a bewildering variety of fence-straddling securi-
ties . . . that, although by no means innocent of tax motivations, seek to 
meet genuine business objectives achievable only by abandoning the 
historic distinction between the terms “pure debt” and “pure equity.”  
1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 2, ¶ 4.03[1] (citations omitted). 
Some courts otherwise would resist this strict application of the arm’s length 
test.  In Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, the court granted judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict in favor of the taxpayer.  397 F. Supp. 753, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d, 555 
F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977).  The government agreed that outsiders would have pur-
chased the debentures on the same terms as they were sold to the stockholders.  Id. 
at 763.  But the court accepted that the taxpayer “was unable to establish that an un-
related person would have purchased a debt instrument, similar to the seven percent 
subordinated debenture, solely for the interest to be earned, that is, without some 
equity acquisition in the corporation.”  Id.  The court further stated that  
     [t]he fact that outsiders might have refused to advance money on 
the debentures alone, however, is not significant.  The economic reali-
ties of an entire transaction should be determined not by an analysis of 
a part but of the whole. . . .  Eliminating the equity that went with the 
debentures would change the whole picture.   
Id. at 763–64. 
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tion of the instrument into debt and equity, rather than imposing an 
all or nothing result.
63
 
The application of a single arm’s length lender test might ap-
pear to be folly, as it conceivably does not capture and weigh all of 
the factors currently considered by the courts.  Many of the current 
judicial multifactor tests of debt classification, however, could be con-
sidered as attempts, in substance, at satisfying a third-party lender 
test, but by looking at what facts a third-party lender would assess rather than 
relying on evidence as to what would be the final conclusion of a third-party 
lender.
64
  A third-party lender, in determining whether to extend a 
loan to a corporate borrower, would presumably weigh many of the 
factors that judges also now consider.  In Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, for example, lenders would consider the following factors: thin 
or adequate capitalization; risk (which examines the unconditional 
nature of the obligation to repay and payments that were not depen-
dent on profits or excused in the event of losses); whether loans were 
available from outside creditors (the inquiry itself); whether pay-
ments were made when due; and “intent” of the parties (determined 
with reference to the presence of fixed dates for payments and the 
lenders’ understanding and knowledge of the corporation’s business 
and a reasonable expectation of its likely success).
65
 
 
 63 The § 385 regulations that were issued between 1980 and 1983, see supra notes 
36–41, did not include a bifurcation option.  In dealing with hybrid instruments, the 
proposed regulations prescribed debt or equity status for the entire instrument based 
on the predominant class of characteristics.  See infra note 208 and accompanying 
text.  In 1989, Congress granted the Treasury authority to promulgate regulations 
that bifurcate instruments.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to fully develop the details of how a bifurcation rule would 
operate in conjunction with the proposed test.   
 64 As discussed in the pages that follow, the courts look to many of the factors 
that would influence a third-party lender’s decision to extend a loan.  However, the 
courts then substitute their judgment as to the result, rather than principally relying 
on factual evidence of what third-party lenders would demand with respect to the 
taxpayer’s circumstances.  Indeed, although the Robertson empirical study of thirty-
two years of Tax Court decisions rejected the use of one factor as conclusive in the 
debt/equity determination, all of the seven factors that were highly predictive of Tax 
Court outcomes in substance were factors that would influence a third-party lender’s 
decision whether to lend funds.  See Robertson et al., supra note 27, 715–16.  
 65 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 943–44 (2003).  See generally COM. LENDING 
COMMERCIAL., AM. BANKERS ASS’N, A BANKER’S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL LOAN ANALYSIS 
(2nd ed. 1977) (relevant factors include experience and business reputation of the 
principals, background of the business, form of organization, financial statement 
analysis, ratio and comparative analysis, and ability to generate cash); Credit Loan, 
Credit Factors: A Potential Small Business Loans Borrower Should Know, 
http://www.creditloan.com/credit-factors-a-potential-small-business-loans-borrower-
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  The factor of proportionality of stock ownership to creditor in-
terests is also a part of the third-party lender inquiry.  In a strictly 
proportionate holding of stock or debt, the shareholder lenders are 
ambivalent as to whether their investment is stock or debt—their risk 
and motivations are the same irrespective of the instrument’s form.
66
  
In a highly disproportionate holding of debt, however, a shareholder 
lender can be viewed as more of a lender than a shareholder, as he or 
she has more at stake financially with respect to the investment de-
nominated as debt.
67
  This disproportionate situation is considered to 
favor debt classification,
68
 but it is in substance seeks to place the 
shareholder lender in a third-party lender position—again, the in-
quiry of the proposed test. 
Several of the judicial factors do not fit with a third-party lender 
test, but they are generally of little consequence.  The factor that con-
siders the extent to which funds were used to acquire capital assets 
(or “core” assets) is generally not applied rigorously by the courts.
69
  
Courts likely understand that some businesses would rent (a form of 
borrowing) or finance the acquisition of core assets; there is no busi-
ness principle dictating that such assets must be backed by equity 
contributions.  Indeed, if the corporate borrower cannot obtain a 
loan to fund such acquisitions, that lack of creditworthiness leads, 
again, to the fundamental facts considered in applying a third-party 
 
should-know.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (factors include debt to worth ratio, fu-
ture cash flows, working capital evaluation, collateral, and “effective management of 
business resources”).  
 66 Of course, if all shareholders are not strictly proportionate with respect to their 
holdings of stock and loans, the priority of payments that debt enjoys would assume 
importance. 
 67 See LIND ET AL., supra note 1, at 142 (“In a closely held setting, debt held by the 
shareholders in the same proportion as their stock holdings normally raises the eye-
brows of the Service.”) (citations omitted).   
 68 See 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 2, ¶ 4.04[2] (“Although it is not fatal per se 
to debt classification, the fact that debt is owed in proportion to stockholdings tends 
to poison the atmosphere and to invite special scrutiny by the courts.”).   
 69 See Plumb, supra note 7, at 522.   
     Plainly, despite occasional verbal flourishes suggesting the contrary, 
the core asset concept is not and cannot be a rule of law, since essential 
assets of a business are often acquired with the aid of outside credit 
and there is no reason, per se, to discriminate merely because share-
holders supply the funds.  
Id. (citations omitted).  In Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, the court observed that 
“[a] substantial portion of the debenture funds appears to have been used to acquire 
capital assets.”  85 T.C.M (CCH) 940, 943 (2003).  Eschewing additional comment on 
this factor, the court ultimately concluded that the capital infusions should be ac-
corded debt treatment.  Id. at 944. 
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arm’s length lender test.  Another factor, management participation 
by the lender, is not particularly useful.  In the context of a closely 
held corporation, management participation is provided through the 
accompanying stock ownership, so it is unnecessary for the corpora-
tion to offer this in the putative debt.
70
 
The proposed test would be generally applied as of the time of 
the capital infusion, ignoring changes in the financial markets and 
the borrower’s financial standing during the term of the loan.
71
  A 
forward-looking quality would be introduced as loans mature, are re-
newed, or are modified,
72
 because the test would be applied at such 
subsequent event.
73
  A demand loan would remain subject to the 
 
 70 See Plumb, supra note 7, at 447 (“Controlling shareholders would rarely, if ever, 
have occasion to provide voting rights in purported debt instruments held by them, 
since such rights would add nothing to the control they otherwise have.”).  Plumb 
suggests that the test is rarely applied in an outcome determinative fashion.  See id. 
(“Although that court, by dictum, said that the presence of voting rights would ‘strong-
ly indicate’ an equity interest, it is all but impossible to find a decision in which that 
view has been applied.”) (citation omitted). 
 71 See Lease v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121, 1126 (1993). 
     Generally, the time for applying the tests required to classify a 
transaction as debt or equity is at its inception.  For the most part, this 
creates a one-way street.  Although an advance may initially qualify as 
debt and then become equity at a later date, an advance initially 
treated as equity will not thereafter become debt, unless there is a later 
recapitalization or the equivalent.   
Id. (citations omitted).  Nevertheless, the debt or equity classification analysis under 
current law has a wait-and-see bias.  In Delta Plastics, Inc., the Tax Court stated,  
     In spite of petitioner’s initial debt-to-equity ratio of 26:1, prior to 
startup of petitioner, petitioner’s officers and directors understood pe-
titioner’s business and the plastics manufacturing industry and reason-
ably projected that petitioner would be successful.  As a result of reve-
nues quickly generated by its operations, petitioner’s debt-to-equity 
ratio was reduced in just over 3 years to 4:1.  This reduction indicates 
to us, in this case, that petitioner was adequately capitalized from its 
inception. 
85 T.C.M (CCH) at 943. 
 72 The March 24, 1980, proposed regulations treated a “substantive” change in 
the terms of an instrument as a new issuance.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(2), 
45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18969–70 (Mar. 24, 1980).  Substitutions of collateral and pre-
payments were not considered substantive changes.  Id. 
 73 Cf. I.R.C. §306(g) (2006) (providing that § 306 tests are applied at a later date 
“if a substantial change is made in the terms and conditions of any stock”); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1001-3(a) (1996) (modification of debt instrument treated as a taxable ex-
change). 
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arm’s length test throughout its duration.
74
  But even with an arm’s 
length test, there must be measures to address de facto modifications 
of the instrument through events such as nonpayment of interest or 
principal or other failures to abide by the stated loan terms.
75
 
So that the test would not be employed to reconsider capital 
contributions already conceded to be equity by their form, certain 
factors would remain requirements for debt status before application 
of the third-party lender test, such as investments denominated as 
common or preferred stock, the § 385 factors of whether there is a 
written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified 
date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate consideration 
in money or money’s worth, and payment of a fixed rate of interest.  
This acknowledges the taxpayer’s continuing prerogative to dictate at 
least the opening issues in controversy through the selection of the 
form and labels of the obligation.
76
  The unconditional, specified date 
and fixed rate requirements would also sift out securities that permit 
the postponement of interest payments or for which the “interest” is 
tied to the profits of the issuer.
77
 
 
 74 The March 24, 1980, proposed regulation singled out demand loans payable to 
principal owners of the corporation for special scrutiny.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-
7(d)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18970.  
 75 The March 24, 1980, proposed regulations treated instruments as stock if the 
holder was a principal shareholder of the corporation and the holder failed to pur-
sue “available remedies with the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor” 
upon the failure to pay interest or to pay principal within ninety days of a principal 
due date.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(d)(3)(ii), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18970.; cf. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1001-3(c)(1)(i) (providing that a loan modification arises from any altera-
tion stemming from oral or written agreement, by the parties’ conduct, or “other-
wise”). 
 76 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  The 1992 amendments to § 385 
added subsection c, which provides that the form adopted by the taxpayer is binding 
on the taxpayer.  I.R.C. § 385(c)(1). 
 77 The “fixed rate of interest” would permit floating rates tied to an external in-
dex or standard but would preclude linkage to the issuer’s profits.  This resembles 
the S corporation straight debt safe harbor which requires  
any written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified 
date a sum certain in money if (i) the interest rate (and interest pay-
ment dates) are not contingent on profits, the borrower’s discretion, 
or similar factors, (ii) there is no convertibility (directly or indirectly) 
into stock, and (iii) the creditor is an individual (other than a nonresi-
dent alien), an estate, [certain trusts], or a person which is actively and 
regularly engaged in the business of lending money. 
I.R.C. § 1361(c)(5)(B).  As discussed in the text that follows, the proposed test treats 
convertibility in a different manner.  See infra notes 201–07 and accompanying text.  
The Service has declined to apply the unconditional payment requirement to debts 
of public companies.  See id. 
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Even if a borrower is otherwise creditworthy, the failure to re-
spect formality in the terms of the loan documentation could still 
produce equity classification because a third-party lender would not 
accept such sloppy evidence of its loan.  This was the situation in Segel 
v. Commissioner, where the Tax Court wrote, 
 Most important to our ruling in this case, . . . however, is the in-
dependent creditor test. . . .  The focus . . . is not simply on the 
ability of the corporation to obtain funds from outside sources; 
rather, the focus is whether an outside lender would have lent the 
funds on the same or similar terms.  We do not doubt that an outside 
lender could have been found to finance Presidential’s incorpora-
tion and operations; Joseph Segel’s experience and track record 
were impressive and likely would have been sufficient to convince 
a lender to finance Presidential.  What we cannot believe, howev-
er, is that a disinterested outside lender would have lent the mon-
ey to Presidential in a debtor-creditor relationship on the same, 
or anywhere near the same, terms as did the shareholders. 
 . . . . 
 . . . We believe that an outside lender, at the outset, would re-
quire some formal indicia of the understanding by which the 
funds are advanced; even if the payments were on open account, 
a prudent businessperson would require a written agreement to 
that effect to protect such an investment.  Additionally, we believe 
that an outside lender would require interest for use of the funds 
and some time or schedule for repayment, if not some security for 
the debt as well.
78
 
B. Establishing the Arm’s Length Standard 
Although the hypothetical arm’s length standard
79
 can be pro-
nounced in the abstract, applying the standard will challenge litigants 
and the courts.  As demonstrated by experience with the arm’s length 
valuation standard applied under § 482,
80
 simply stating the test is not 
 
 78 89 T.C. 816, 832, 833–34 (1987). 
 79 There is a rich body of academic discourse concerning the definition and 
function of “rules” as compared with “standards” or “principles.”  See, e.g., Louis Kap-
low, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).  Kaplow, for 
example, notes that such definitions “commonly emphasize the distinction between 
whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.”  Id. at 559.  The proposed test is a 
rule but includes as a component the arm’s length standard. 
 80 The arm’s length standard language is not located in I.R.C. § 482 itself but has 
been adopted by the regulations.  See Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 
2009) (“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the stan-
dard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer.”).  The § 482 regulations and § 7872 impose requirements 
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enough.  Interested actors must be able to quantify the term.  The § 
482 arm’s length standard has been applied primarily through the 
use of extensive economic analysis by experts, which the courts have 
found to be helpful, but not binding.
81
  The § 482 arm’s length stan-
dard is a market valuation test, in part based on “the belief in the ef-
ficiency of markets and the complementary emphasis on commercial 
competition as a guarantor of perfect markets . . . .”
82
 
Two mighty, highly fact-dependent steps are required in apply-
ing the proposed arm’s length lender test.  As with § 482,
83
 the first 
step is selection of the appropriate lender market for financing the 
corporation.
84
  Reliable data about the appropriate market
85
 and the 
 
for the rate of interest on related-party and corporation/shareholder loans but do 
not address the debt versus equity question.  See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(C); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.482-2(a) (as amended in 2009).  Additionally, the impact of potentially value-
diminishing rights or restrictions in the federal wealth transfer taxation context is 
subject to an exception that applies an arm’s length test.  See I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3) 
(“[T]erms are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an 
arms’ length transaction.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 226, 331, 335 (1991) (two eco-
nomic experts, Baumol and Lynk, in addition to other experts); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Comm’r, 84 T.C. 996, 1137, 1146 (1985) (four economic experts, Brozen, Baumol, 
Berry, and Comanor, in addition to other experts).  The Tax Court in Sundstrand de-
scribed the level of deference given to experts:  
     We weigh expert testimony in light of the expert’s qualifications as 
well as all the other credible evidence in the record.  We are not bound 
by the opinion of any expert witness, and we will accept or reject that 
expert testimony when, in our best judgment, based on the record, it is 
appropriate to do so.  While we may choose to accept the opinion of 
one expert in its entirety, we may also be selective in the use of any 
portion of that opinion.   
96 T.C. at 359 (citations omitted); see also  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of 
Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 
151 (1995) (“The IRS spent about $15 million on expert witnesses in section 482 cas-
es in 1992, and a recent Treasury report recommends increased use of such ex-
perts.”).  
 82 Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for 
Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 102 (2008). 
 83 See id. at 105–07 (discussing difficulties in applying a market valuation ap-
proach in § 482 transfer pricing). 
 84 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text (identifying the possible hypo-
thetical lenders). 
 85 The 2008 U.S. financial crisis produced observations that the credit markets 
for all corporations had “frozen up” to various degrees.  See David Bogoslaw, Where the 
Credit Freeze Has Thawed, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 9, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2008/pi2008108_563455.htm 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  This was evident in the bond market as investment grade 
companies had 834 bond offerings for $551 billion through September 30, 2008, 
down from 1782 offerings for $752 billion over the same time period in 2007.  Id.  
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standards of that market must be gathered.  As a second step, those 
external factors must then be applied to the corporate borrower’s re-
levant facts in constructing the hypothetical lender’s loan, which will 
be compared to the existing loan for which debt classification is 
claimed. 
In addition to the problems of proof, market-based tests of this 
nature may be imperfect even if a third-party market standard can be 
established.  Some shareholders will presumably loan money to the 
corporation, even if a third-party loan is available, to reduce the in-
trusion and transaction costs attendant to such loans and to benefit 
from potentially attractive interest rates.
86
  Simply put, all shareholder 
loans should not be considered suspect.  More fundamentally, it 
 
Small business was hit particularly hard because if banks have to pull back, they will 
tend to pull back from small business loans first.  Emily Maltby & Stacy Cowley, Credit 
Crunch Freezes Hiring, Expansion, CNN MONEY, Sept. 25, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/24/smallbusiness/small_biz_credit_freeze.smb/in
dex.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  In the last three months of 2008, the SBA backed 
less than half the number of loans that it approved a year earlier, and in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2009, there was a fifty-seven percent drop in SBA backed loans 
as compared to the first quarter 2008.  Emily Maltby, Sharp Plunge in Small Business 
Loans, CNN MONEY, Jan. 6, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/05/ 
smallbusiness/sba_loans_plunge.smb (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  This is partly the re-
sult of tightened lending standards (the Federal Reserve reported in October 2008 
that seventy-five percent of banks polled had tightened lending standards for small 
business loans in the previous three months), small businesses experiencing poor 
sales and not wishing to expand in a poor economic climate, banks wanting to pro-
tect their bottom line, and a decrease in the value of assets that business owners can 
use as collateral.  Id.  Although the proposed arm’s length test offers some flexibility 
considering the “substantially in the same manner” phrasing, see supra note 51 and 
accompanying text, there is no principled way (outside of a new safe harbor divorced 
from the market) to smooth out shifts in the market.  That said, in applying the § 
1274(d)  applicable federal rate (which is a market rate tied to Treasury obligations) 
to selected transactions, some leeway is allowed by permitting the taxpayer to choose 
the interest rate for the month of the transaction or for either of the two months 
preceding the transaction.  I.R.C. § 1274(d) (2006); see Treas. Reg. § 1.7520-2(a)(2) 
(1994).  Otherwise, a strict application of the proposed test may unfairly punish 
those that are unable to find financing during tough and irrational economic times.  
On the other hand, “irrationality” in lending markets can also work to the taxpayer’s 
advantage in boom times by producing a more liberal third-party lending standard.  
 86 See Kaplan & Yoder, supra note 37, at 596. 
[O]btaining loans from shareholders rather than from a bank might 
be faster, less cumbersome, and less intrusive.  Lengthy loan applica-
tions and detailed—perhaps even audited—financial statements can 
usually be avoided by going to the company’s stockholders.  Moreover, 
if a company’s prospects look promising . . . there may be a feeling that 
the interest money should be kept in the “family,” rather than paid to 
outsiders. 
Id. 
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could be that the third-party lender market suffers from a lack of 
complete information about the borrower’s prospects, as compared 
with the level of knowledge possessed by the shareholders, creating 
asymmetrical information.
87
  This asymmetry could be reflected in re-
luctance by third-party lenders to extend loans in a particular situa-
tion, as contrasted with the shareholders.  In addition, information 
asymmetries may be more pronounced with the complexity of the 
borrower’s enterprise.  A retail store or franchise, for example, may 
be easier to evaluate than a technology firm.  If one pursues this 
point to its conclusion, the technology firm may be disadvantaged 
under the proposed test as compared with the more conventional 
undertaking.  Although this is an intriguing argument, at worst it 
could muddy the third-party test with the potentially unfounded op-
timistic claims of entrepreneurs or the less than rational motivations
88
 
that are a part of any start-up venture; the reality is that start-up busi-
nesses often fail.
89
  A better response to information asymmetries lies 
in ensuring that all relevant information is considered in applying the 
hypothetical third-party lender test to a particular corporation.  Un-
 
 87 I thank Victor Fleischer for his insights on this point. 
 88 See supra note 54.  Family and friends are typically the source of capital for 
start-up businesses.  Id.  An arm’s length test needs to ignore motivations founded 
on, or investment decisions clouded by, kinship or friendship, as the test could oth-
erwise lose the benefit of arm’s length, third-party, rational, and profit-seeking mar-
ket comparables.  That said, the Treasury’s § 385 regulations project was criticized 
for its partial reliance on an “independent creditor” test, due to the difficulty of es-
tablishing what such a creditor would demand in difficult situations.  See Levin & Bo-
wen, supra note 28, 40–41 (“Often, even after the rules have been correctly followed, 
the answer to these questions will turn on extremely difficult factual determinations, 
such as the rate an independent creditor would charge a closely held corporation in 
a very risky, high-technology business or in financial difficulty for a heavily subordi-
nated loan. . . .”).   
 89 The statistics on business failures vary from source to source and depend on 
the relevant time frame, but there seems to be a consensus that the failure rate for 
start-up businesses is at least fifty percent.  See SCOTT SHANE, THE ILLUSIONS OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 98–99 (2008) (Figure 6.2 shows that only twenty-nine percent of 
businesses started in 1992 were still in business in 2002); Zeke Camusio, Business Fail-
ure Rate: What is the Real Business Failure Rate and Why Businesses Fail, EZINE ARTICLES, 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Failure-Rate---What-is-the-Real-Business-Failure-
Rate-and-Why-Businesses-Fail&id=1736448 (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) (“Between 75% 
and 90% of all new businesses fail within the first 10 years.”); Chains that Train New 
Store Owners Help Keep Franchises Afloat, U.S. FED. NEWS, Mar. 6, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 15984253 (“failure rate for traditional start-up businesses . . . can approach 
70%”); John Luciew, Bad Economy: Is It Time to Start a Business?, PATRIOT NEWS (Har-
risburg, Pa.), May 31, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 10554092 (“failure rate for 
business start-ups remains a ruthless 50 percent-plus”). 
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like insiders in other settings, the taxpayer will have an incentive to 
make all positive information available for court consideration. 
If an arm’s length standard is to be part of the dominant test ap-
plied in classifying capital infusions for income tax purposes, the 
proof of the standard may be established in several ways.  The courts’ 
role in assessing the financial capacity of the corporate borrower will 
remain of importance, but rigorous, informed application of the test 
will likely require a degree of financial sophistication and knowledge 
of current financial markets beyond the expertise of most judges.
90
  
The testimony of expert witnesses would play a more important role, 
although debt classification cases already feature significant reliance 
on expert witnesses.  In National Farmers Union Service Corp. v. United 
 
 90 For closely held corporations, credit scores from small business credit rating 
agencies, such as FD Insight, D&B, and Experian Business, for example, would pro-
vide an external marker.  For public corporations, ratings from third parties such as 
Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investor Services, and Standard & Poor’s would play a role.  
“In essence, a credit rating reflects a rating agency’s opinion, as of a specific date, of 
the creditworthiness of a particular company, security, or obligation.”  SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET 5 (2003).  The rating agencies provide ratings 
on both long-term debt obligations, such as bonds, and short-term obligations like 
commercial paper.  TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN 
BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS 8 (2005).  Some of 
the factors that the rating agencies consider are  
(a) quantitative data from the issuer about its financial position; (b) 
quantitative data the agency gathers on the industry, competitors, and 
the economy; (c) legal advice relating to the specific bond issue; (d) 
qualitative data from the issuer about management, policy, business 
outlook, and accounting practices; and (e) qualitative data the agency 
gathers on such matters as competitive position, quality of manage-
ment, long-term industry prospects and economic environment. 
Id. at 31 (footnote omitted).  After the agency grades an issue, it continues to do sur-
veillance over the issue and will notify investors of any developments that may affect 
the issue’s grade.  Id. at 8.  Executives at the rating agencies are adamant that ratings 
are simply independent opinions on credit risk and not recommendations to buy or 
sell securities.  See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored En-
terprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 78, 81 (2007) (statement of 
Michael Kanef, Group Managing Director, Asset Backed Finance Rating Group, 
Moody’s Investor Services).  The quality of the ratings agencies’ evaluations of debt 
instruments has been criticized in the financial downturn that began in 2008, but 
such criticisms were also common before the downturn.  See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regu-
lating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 44 (2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel 
and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 621 (1999); Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rat-
ing Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 343–46 (2006); Francis A. Bot-
tini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals 
for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 585–88 (1993).   
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States, for example, the trial court relied on the testimony of an offic-
er from a large Denver bank who stated that “without question a 
commercial bank or other unrelated informed lender would not have 
made the advances.”
91
  The witness applied commercial lending stan-
dards that, to a degree, resemble the multifactor tests applied by the 
courts.  The bank officer took into consideration “the absence of se-
curity, upon the apparent inability of the taxpayer to service the debt 
without invading its working capital, and the absence of any loan 
agreement, acceleration provisions, and without any analysis of cash 
flow from taxpayer’s subsidies.”
92
  Indeed, who is better equipped 
than a finance professional to make these analyses? 
On the other hand, in the clearest cases one would expect 
judges to continue the practice of applying their judgment of what a 
hypothetical independent lender would require if the precise ques-
tion is not fully developed in the record by either party, but the pro-
posed test’s promotion of better evidence should discourage this.  
For example, in Hardman v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s classification as a con-
tribution to capital, observing that “[t]he district court found that 
Hardman, Inc. was an ongoing, viable corporation with assets. . . .  
Presumably Hardman, Inc. could easily obtain financing from other 
sources and the government makes no assertion to the contrary.”
93
 
In applying the current multifactor test for debt classification, 
the courts have, not unexpectedly, demonstrated varying degrees of 
rigor in assessing witness testimony on the third-party lender issue.  In 
Bauer v. Commissioner, a victory for the taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit re-
lied on its own analysis of the corporation’s creditworthiness as well 
as the testimony of witnesses from the banking sector: 
 [The corporation’s] financial structure and these other factors 
indicate that [it] could readily have obtained a loan from a bank 
or other financial institution for the purpose for which the stock-
holders’ loans were made, which was to finance inventory and ac-
counts receivable.  There is specific evidence in this case that one 
bank would have been willing to make these loans.  In a letter 
from a vice president of Bank of America that was attached to the 
Stipulated Facts, the officer noted that it had dealt with [the cor-
poration] and was familiar with [its] financing during the years in 
question and the bank was “ready to make bank loans for those 
 
 91 400 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir 1968). 
 92 Id. 
 93 827 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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amounts of officers’ loans and/or more if [the corporation] de-
sired to use bank financing.”
94
 
In Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, the government prevailed, 
and the court referred to “the uncontradicted testimony that in 1934 
it was impossible to obtain any outside mortgage financing for real 
estate of this kind except through the device of a purchase money 
mortgage taken back by the seller.”
95
  This is to be contrasted with Del-
ta Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, a taxpayer victory in which the Tax 
Court judge simply found that “ [t]he evidence indicates that peti-
tioner was successful in obtaining secured loans from outside credi-
tors, and at no time was petitioner refused a loan from a third par-
ty.”
96
 
Other courts have been less receptive to bank officer hypotheti-
cals of the type offered in Bauer.  In John Lizak, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
the Court stated: 
To be sure, petitioners did offer testimony of Robert C. Brainard, 
who had been an assistant cashier at [the taxpayer’s] bank at the 
time of [the corporation’s] incorporation and who had since be-
come a vice president, to the effect that the bank would have 
made a loan to the corporation in an amount approaching that 
purportedly lent by [the taxpayer].  However, the short answer is 
that we found his testimony wholly unconvincing and did not be-
lieve it.  Certainly, we do not believe that any lender in an arm’s-
length transaction would have advanced an amount equivalent to 
that involved herein in the circumstances of this case, particularly 
on the terms granted by  [taxpayer] i.e., without any security, or 
interest, or maturity.
97
 
Similarly, in a decision that was reversed on appeal by the Ninth 
Circuit, the district court judge criticized comparable testimony as 
just another instance in which a bank officer stretched the truth 
for a good customer on facts that did not and probably would 
never occur.  Luckily, the bank officer did not have to defend the 
 
 94 748 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1984).   
 95 398 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1968).  Although the “substantially similar” standard 
of the proposed test imparts a measure of flexibility, the use of third-party lenders to 
establish the market will tend to likewise produce equity characterizations when the 
third-party lending market is uninviting.   
 96 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 944 (2003).  The loans in question were unsecured de-
bentures, and the passage refers to past lending practice, so this statement only tan-
gentially addressed the issue of whether the debentures would satisfy an arm’s length 
standard.  See id. 
 97 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 804, 808 (1969). 
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loan before a bank examiner, and obviously he did not expect an-
yone to believe his testimony.
98
 
The overwhelming majority of tax cases
99
 originate in the Tax 
Court where a jury is not available.
100
  Generally, Tax Court findings 
of fact are binding on an appellate court unless they are clearly erro-
neous.
101
  The appellate courts, however, are currently split on wheth-
er debt classification is a question of law or fact, which determines the 
standard of review and the concomitant degree of deference to the 
trial court.
102
  Given the highly factual nature of properly applying the 
proposed legal standard, the results of the arm’s length classification 
test should be treated as a question of fact. 
One would expect that if an arm’s length standard were adopted 
as the principal test of debt/equity classification, taxpayers and the 
government in litigation would respond by providing higher quality 
evidence of that standard, prompting more rigorous factual analysis 
by courts.
103
  Development of the facts of a case often determines the 
outcome, but development of the facts rests with the litigants and 
their legal counsel.  Admittedly, an expert witness is often an advo-
cate for the party who retains the witness.  Warts notwithstanding, the 
role of expert witnesses in tax litigation is already important, particu-
larly in matters of valuation.
104
  Although the arm’s length standard 
 
 98 Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D. Or. 1965), 
rev’d, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 99 Judge Laro of the United States Tax Court has placed the percentage of tax 
litigation originating in the Tax Court at over ninety-five percent.  See David Laro, 
The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 18. 
 100 A jury trial is available in Federal District Court but not in the Tax Court or the 
Court of Federal Claims.  See U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, UNITED STATES COURT OF 
FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE PEOPLE’S COURT 9 (2006), available at 
http://www.ucfc.uscourts.gov/ (follow “Jurisdiction” banner to the “Brochure” 
hyperlink); U.S. Tax Court, About the Court, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010).  
 101 See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX 
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 11.13[3] (2d ed. 1997). 
 102 See generally Nathan R. Christensen, Comment, The Case for Reviewing 
Debt/Equity Determinations for Abuse of Discretion, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2007) (ac-
knowledging the split and recommending an abuse of discretion standard of review). 
 103 To further encourage the production of quality evidence of the arm’s length 
standard by taxpayers, amendments to § 385 could expressly override the rule of 
I.R.C. § 7491 (2006), which otherwise shifts the burden of persuasion to the govern-
ment if the taxpayer meets the burden of production with respect to factual issues.  
See also supra note 53 (failure to meet the arm’s length third-party lender test would 
produce a presumption of equity classification).    
 104 See JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 5.01[2][c][ii] (2006 & 2008 
Cum. Supp. No. 2) (“In virtually all of the cases in which the [fractional interest] dis-
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would have primacy, judges would retain their prerogative to deter-
mine the weight to be given to the testimony.
105
  But that could bring 
us back to the status quo of judges acting as lending or financial ex-
perts—a role for which most are not suited.
106
 
A solution that would blend judicial discretion with a substantive 
change in the law evoked by the adoption of an arm’s length third-
party lender test would rest on the promulgation of regulations.  This 
Article proposes that the Treasury adopt the proposed rule as a regu-
lation, using its authority under § 385.
107
  Although the Treasury’s 
prior efforts in 1980–1983 were unsuccessful,
108
 the proposed test 
would apply to a narrower context (shareholder loans).  Further, the 
test would be more conceptual than the judicial multifactor test, and 
less rule-based than the withdrawn § 385 regulations, promoting flex-
ibility in application while avoiding prolixity in the expression of the 
regulatory intent.
109
 
C. The Promise of the Proposed Test 
As discussed in Part II, the multifactor judicial classification test 
is now firmly entrenched, and consequently, the courts have great 
 
count has been established, an expert’s opinion on the subject backed it up.”).  Tax 
Court Rule 143(g) requires a written expert witness report, and a copy of the report 
must be furnished to the court and opposing counsel at least 30 days before the call 
of the trial calendar.  TAX CT. R. 143(g). 
 105 See, e.g., Lukens v. Comm’r, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding Tax 
Court’s disregard of parts of expert’s report and adoption of its own valuation formu-
la).  See generally Joni Larson, Tax Evidence III: A Primer on the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
Applied by the Tax Court, 62 TAX LAW. 555, 654–72 (2009) (discussing the rules of evi-
dence as applied to expert testimony in the Tax Court). 
 106 The cases are split as to whether the debt classification question is a question 
of law or fact.  See generally Christensen, supra note 102, at 1309 & n.1.  
 107 The Treasury also enjoys general authority to promulgate regulations under 
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).  The regulations would not have retroactive effect, except 
with respect to demand loans already in place and modifications or renewals of exist-
ing loans.  Id. 
 108 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
 109 The proposed § 385 regulations presented a number of classification rules that 
required lengthy explanations and examples.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 18957, 18963–72 (Mar. 24, 1980).  For example, the January 5, 1982, proposed 
regulations, the last substantive proposal by the Treasury, filled eighteen pages and 
offered approximately ninety-eight illustrations and examples.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.385-0 to 1.385-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 170, 170–87 (Jan. 5, 1982).  In comparison, the 
proposed test provides a rule which relies on a factually based standard.  Cf. Kaplow, 
supra note 79 (discussing the difference between rules and standards).  As compared 
with a formulaic rule, standards are considered to be more flexible, but can be more 
costly to apply.  Id. at 557. 
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experience in applying it.  Moreover, with the unsuccessful attempts 
to refine the principles through the adoption of § 385 and its still-
born interpretive regulations, the multifactor judicial approach, even 
if imperfect, remains the primary source of guidance.  Adopting the 
proposed test will involve some degree of change with concomitant 
dislocation, experimentation, and costs in adapting to the new rules.  
It is not sufficient to justify the proposed test simply on its appeal 
from the purely intellectual basis that it solves or clarifies a longstand-
ing logical or analytical problem.
110
  Accordingly, this Part contends 
that the benefits of the proposed test outweigh its drawbacks.  The 
discussion is in part couched in customary tax policy principles that 
include administrability, equity, and efficiency.
111
 
1. Simplicity, Predictability and Administrability 
The traditional debt/equity characterization doctrine is largely 
so discretionary as to be unadministrable in any principled way, 
which can result in unfairness and abuse, as well as unacceptable 
transaction costs.  Adoption of the proposed test, which primarily fo-
cuses on an easily enunciated single factor, should simplify the in-
come tax classification of shareholder loans.  Taxpayers structuring 
 
 110 Llewellyn, for example, in an essay that spoke of “aesthetics,” “structured beau-
ty,” and “elegance,” ultimately concluded that beauty must serve a functional role.  
See Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 
229 (1942).  “But the prime test of its legal beauty remains the functional test.  Struc-
tural harmony, structural grandeur, are good to have, they add, they enrich; but they 
are subsidiary.  So is ornament.  Legal aesthetics are in first essence functional esthet-
ics.”  Id.  As discussed in the text that follows, the proposed test’s greatest strengths 
lie in its simplicity.  The philosophical doctrine of “Occam’s Razor” has many inter-
pretations, but some would employ it to suggest that “simplicity is a theoretical vir-
tue” or that “simplicity has intrinsic value.”  See Alan Baker, Simplicity, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2008/entries/simplicity/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).  Occam’s Razor has 
been employed in legal scholarship and judicial decisions.  See, e.g., Young v. Young, 
191 P.3d 1258, 1261 (Wash. 2008); Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying 
Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
727 (2004).   
 111 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 
(2006) (“The current debate in the United States about whether the income tax 
should be replaced with a consumption tax has been waged on the traditional 
grounds for evaluating tax policy: efficiency, equity, and administrability.”); Lily L. 
Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 23, 42 (2006) (identifying minimization of administrative and com-
pliance costs, distributional fairness, and efficiency as principles upon which any tax 
system should be built); Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in 
a Progressive Tax World, 9 NEV. L.J. 130, 130 (2008) (“Scholars typically apply three cri-
teria to evaluate a tax: fairness, efficiency, and simplicity.”). 
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their affairs—as well as the Service monitoring and courts reviewing 
those structures—would consider a simple question: would a disinte-
rested lender agree to loan the money to the corporation in this fa-
shion?  This is to be contrasted with the bundle of factors that courts 
now weigh.  Greater simplicity should reduce taxpayer transaction 
costs in structuring transactions and in predicting the income tax re-
sult of such structure ex ante.
112
  A simpler test should also reduce the 
Service’s enforcement costs and hopefully deter aggressive taxpayer 
positions.  The administrative and compliance costs of a tax provision 
also detract from its efficiency so that gains in administrability should 
improve efficiency.
113
  Further, the magnitude of the offsetting trans-
action costs that the change in rules produces should be moderate 
because, as discussed earlier, the proposed test is not a dramatic de-
parture from many of the core concepts of the multifactor test.  
Courts already have been, in substance, looking at many of the same 
facts that underlie the proposed test.
114
 
 
 112 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES 160 (3d ed. 2004) (“Small and medium-size businesses also incur 
significant compliance costs.  In fact, studies consistently find that the smaller the 
firm, the larger the cost of complying with the tax system per dollar of tax payment, 
sales, assets, or any other measure of the size of the firm.”).  In speaking to his pro-
posal for a taxable income adjustment (aimed at addressing the book in-
come/taxable income gap), Shaviro argues that, although enhanced penalties and 
enforcement could play a partial role, his proposal  
would reduce the managerial incentive to waste resources engaging in 
transactions that are legally permissible, and thus that would survive 
heightened scrutiny, and yet that serve no good social purpose beyond 
advancing the manager’s income manipulation goals.  Examples in-
clude creating hybrid financial instruments that are debt for tax, but 
not accounting, purposes and engaging in tax shelter transactions that 
have just enough economic substance to withstand IRS review. 
Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Account-
ing Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 482 (2009).  As discussed in the 
text that follows, there is some question whether a clearer standard alone would in-
duce shareholders in closely held businesses to eschew excessive loans.  Id. 
 113 See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 24 (1992). 
     The standard tax efficiency norm of minimizing excess burden im-
plies two principal objectives.  The first is minimizing substitution ef-
fects, or changes in taxpayer decisions or behavior due to the tax sys-
tem.  The second is minimizing what I call “tax overhead costs,” or the 
amount of resources (including the value of time or labor) consumed 
in applying the tax system, through taxpayer and government activities 
such as tax planning, compliance, litigation, administration, and law-
making.   
Id. 
 114 See supra notes 64–70, 90–98 and accompanying text. 
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Although one might be hopeful that the adoption of a simpler 
characterization test would lead to greater corporate compliance,
115
 
that may not be the case, particularly with regard to closely held cor-
porations, the context in which most shareholder loans arise. 
The use of excessive debt in a closely held corporation, some-
times referred to as “thinning” the capital structure,
116
 is almost with-
out any external constraints
117
 if the corporation does not need to 
maintain relevant financial ratios or satisfy guidelines of third-party 
lenders,
118
 or is not courting new investors or potential buyers.
119
 
 
 115 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 187. 
 116 See, e.g., ZOLMAN CAVITCH & MATTHEW P. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.04[1] (2d ed. 2003) (“By incorporating thin, 
we mean the procedure whereby the smallest possible amount of assets are trans-
ferred into the corporation as equity capital.”). 
 117 Schizer refers to external constraints on tax planning as “frictions.”  See David 
M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1315 
(2001).  Although shareholder loans might be subordinated to the claims of other 
creditors in bankruptcy, that is a better starting place than a formal equity contribu-
tion, which will surely have a lower priority in the competition for any liquidating 
proceeds.  See generally 1 DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 18, § 6:61. 
 118 Interest is an expense for financial accounting purposes so corporate earnings 
are reduced.  See generally RICHARD G. SCHROEDER, ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
THEORY AND ANALYSIS 373–74 (9th ed. 2009) (discussing the straight-line method and 
effective interest method of reporting a bond’s interest expense).  Debt is a liability 
for financial accounting purposes, so financial ratios used in financial or credit anal-
ysis (such as the debt-to-equity ratio) are also reduced.  Id. at  505.  See generally DAVID 
R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 331–429 (4th ed. 2006) 
(discussing financial statement analysis and financial ratios).  There may be other 
internal consequences if debt is used if, for example, employee bonuses or share-
holder stock repurchase agreements are in part linked to levels of net income after 
interest expense.  Id.  “Financial reporting should provide information that is useful 
to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions.”  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 1 (1978), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_CON1.pdf.  
Thus, for public corporations, it is of great importance to maintain financial ratios 
for the purposes of satisfying lending covenants or maintaining financial ratings.  For 
example, the recent downgrade of General Electric’s credit rating was a significant 
event, producing consequences including as increased costs of financing its opera-
tions.  See Ben Steverman, The Triple-A Rating: Going Extinct?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 
13, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2009/ 
pi20090312_235326.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).  The corporation’s level of share-
holder equity, which is a product of the amount of capital contributions characte-
rized as debt or equity, can impact state corporate law limitations on distributions.  
See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, 
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 207–14 (2009) (discuss-
ing limitations on corporate distributions under corporate statutes).  Closely held 
corporations often do not pay regular dividends, instead relying on the payment of 
income tax deductible salaries or interest.  See id. at 199.  Due to the shortcomings of 
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The aggressive use of debt in a closely held corporate structure is 
also almost without meaningful income tax risk.  If the taxpayer con-
cedes the issue at the outset of the transaction and uses a conservative 
amount of equity, the corporation is assured that it cannot claim an 
interest expense deduction with respect to that capital.  Further, the 
shareholders can withdraw equity capital with not altogether benign 
income tax consequences only if the corporate redemption excep-
tions apply.
120
  In comparison, an aggressive allocation to debt from 
the outset at least gives the corporation an opportunity to claim an 
interest expense deduction and permit tax-free repayments of the 
principal.
121
  The corporation must be selected for audit,
122
 and the 
Service must prevail, and both of those probabilities are less than cer-
tain.  In addition, the statute of limitations patiently and methodically 
reduces the taxpayer’s level of risk for prior years.
123
  For example, the 
 
corporate law’s protection of general creditors, loan covenants may be utilized to fill 
the resulting gaps.  “Given the illusory protections afforded creditors under state 
corporate law, it is understandable that those creditors with the power to do so have 
turned to contract law to protect themselves against potentially harmful distributions 
to the corporate debtors’ shareholders.”  Id. at 214; cf. id. (“Banks and other lending 
institutions often impose outright prohibitions or substantial limitations on the pay-
ment of dividends, share repurchases, and other forms of corporation distribu-
tions.”).  
 119 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 112, at 426 n.5 (“Privately held companies may also seek 
to over-measure their earnings—for example, to impress prospective buyers or inves-
tors. . . .”).   
 120 See I.R.C. §§ 302–304 (2006) (treating qualifying corporate redemptions as a 
sale of the shareholder’s stock).  While redemption treatment permits sale or ex-
change treatment that in turn allows the shareholder to offset the basis of the re-
deemed shares and to report the gain at favored long-term capital gain rates, the 
transaction nevertheless produces potential gain or loss.  Id.  In a family-controlled 
corporation, the potential application of I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) must be considered if a 
loss is recognized on the redemption.  
 121 See supra note 12.  
 122 For fiscal year 2007, the rate of audits for corporations with total assets under 
$10,000,000 was 0.9 percent.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, TABLE 
9: EXAMINATION COVERAGE: RECOMMENDED AND AVERAGE RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL 
TAX AFTER EXAMINATION, BY TYPE AND SIZE OF RETURN, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 1 (2009), 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=207079,00.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
 123 If a tax return is filed, then barring fraud or a substantial understatement of 
gross income, the normal statute of limitations period is three years after the due 
date of the return.  See I.R.C. § 6501(a), (b)(1).   The impact on the shareholder 
must also be considered because the failure to report constructive dividends could 
trigger application of the six-year period for substantial understatements of gross in-
come prescribed by I.R.C. § 6501(e).  See, e.g., Benson v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 1133 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  But if the shareholders are already reporting interest income from the 
putative debt obligations, then only principal repayments will result in an increase in 
gross income if the payments are recharacterized as dividends.  Id.  
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taxpayer in Fin Hay Realty Co. enjoyed almost thirty years of interest 
expense deductions before the issue surfaced.
124
  On the other hand, 
reflecting the randomness of tax enforcement, the taxpayer in Delta 
Plastics, Inc. was audited with respect to its fourth year of operations.
125
 
The possible imposition of penalties, the reluctance to incur 
professional fees, the distractions attendant to an income tax audit, 
and the instinct that it is better to include some equity to improve the 
corporation’s chances of prevailing in an audit are all countervailing 
considerations.  Still, the incentives to use debt in the capital struc-
ture could remain compelling, even in the face of the proposed 
test.
126
  Changes to the statutes of limitation, increased penalties, and 
more audits by the Service are some possible solutions beyond the fo-
cus of this Article.
127
 
2. Improved Reliability of Classification Outcomes and 
Horizontal Equity 
The core claim of this Article is that a hypothetical third-party’s 
assessment that a loan would be made in the manner structured by 
the corporation is the best measure of whether a shareholder loan 
should be treated as such for federal income tax purposes.  Although 
 
 124 See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 695 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 125 See Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 942–43 (2003). 
 126 Although their work continues to be debated, in 1958 Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller argued that the total value of the firm’s securities (its equity and debt 
together) is not increased by the use of debt.  See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, 
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 352–85 (10th ed. 2007) (discussing this is-
sue).  The theory turns on the ability of shareholders to borrow as a substitute for 
borrowing by the corporation.  As Klein and Coffee sum up the issue, “where per-
sonal debt is a perfect substitute for corporate debt, the value of a firm is not affected 
by its capital structure.”  Id. at 360.  The income tax benefits of debt turn in part on a 
comparison of the shareholders’ and the corporation’s tax rates.  Id. at 373.   
     The moral of the story is that debt should be held by individuals, ra-
ther than by corporations, where the individual rate is sufficiently 
higher than the corporate rate and earnings can be retained and rein-
vested at a reasonable rate of return for a sufficiently long period of 
time. . . . It is simply not true, therefore, that the tax system unquali-
fiedly favors corporate debt financing.   
Id.  Klein and Coffee’s examples assume a corporate rate of thirty-five percent, an 
individual rate of thirty-eight percent, and an effective rate on capital gain income of 
ten percent, producing a “slight edge to corporate debt.”  Id. at 373 n.21.   
 127 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662 (penalties for understatement of tax liability).  While 
there is probably no realistic prospect for a different penalty structure applicable on-
ly to corporate debt characterization, one sees calls for increased penalties in gener-
al.  See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
111 (2009). 
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the courts apply this test as one of the multiple factors and also may 
be applying it as part of some of the other factors, the quality of clas-
sification decisions should be improved in instances where the court 
would otherwise be reluctant, or hostile, to fully embracing a third-
party lender analysis.  The proposed test provides a single harmoniz-
ing doctrinal thread.  Quality of decision making should also be im-
proved because the quality of the evidence provided by litigants 
would be more fully developed if the parties know that the third-party 
test is the primary test of classification.  A more thorough develop-
ment of the facts would preclude courts from relying on simple intui-
tion about the loans in question.
128
 
A fundamental tax policy principle is horizontal equity, that si-
milarly situated taxpayers be treated in equal fashion.
129
  The goal of 
horizontal equity is “consistency, meaning that the same tax treat-
ment should apply to economically comparable bets.”
130
  Classification 
doctrine that is more focused and predictable would promote more 
equitable classification treatment among corporate taxpayers, thus 
treating economically comparable bets with more consistency than 
the current multifactor test. 
3. Efficiency 
Although the context shapes the definition,
131
 it is a fair state-
ment that a tax provision is “efficient” if it is economically neutral 
and does not influence taxpayers’ market choices to a degree that 
 
 128 The analyses in Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987), Murphy 
Logging Co.  v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D. Or. 1965), rev’d, 378 F.2d 222 
(9th Cir. 1967), and John Lizak, Inc. v. Comm’r,  28 T.C.M. (CCH) 804, 808 (1969), 
could have benefited from better evidence of third-party lending practices.  See supra 
Part IV.B. 
 129 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 9 (6th ed. 2009) (“Horizontal Equity is imposing similar burdens on people 
in like circumstances. . . .”); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 7 (1976) (“Thus, we derive the principle of horizontal equity: the justness of 
the system is measured in part by the extent to which people with equal incomes pay 
equal taxes.”). 
 130 Samuel D. Brunson, Elective Taxation of Risk-Based Financial Instruments: A Pro-
posal, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 16 (2007) (quoting David M. Schizer, Balance in the 
Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1889 
(2004)). 
 131 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 980–95 (1986) (discussing universal market efficiency, 
sectoral efficiency, and technical efficiency as applied to income tax incentives).   
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would result in suboptimal allocation of society’s total resources.
132
  
Inasmuch as the differing corporate income tax consequences of the 
debt/equity characterization are themselves inefficient as a general 
proposition,
133
 it is not particularly worthwhile to consider at length 
the efficiency consequences of a proposed change that would refine, 
and indeed sharpen, the core doctrinal distinction.  Concerning 
closely held corporations, for which the shareholder loan is most pre-
valent, the loan is a self-help response to mitigate those consequences 
that are at the root of the inefficiency.  Even if that self-help may re-
sult in the overuse of debt, this may not be to the overall non-tax de-
triment of many closely held corporations.
134
  If the proposal would 
diminish to any degree the mitigation role of such debt, that exposes 
a concern with the overall corporate taxation system, not a flaw of the 
proposal.
135
  If the corporate taxation system endures in its current 
 
 132 This definition draws from Zelinsky’s definition of universal market efficiency.  
See id. at 980–87.  Shaviro uses a similar definition:   
The efficiency norm that I use is that of minimizing excess burden, or 
the deadweight loss generated by the tax system.  Excess burden arises 
not only from administrative and compliance costs, but also from subs-
titution effects, or changes in taxpayer decisions or behavior to reduce 
tax liability.  A tax system minimizes substitution effects by being neu-
tral at key decisional boundaries, thereby giving taxpayers no reason to 
change their decisions or behavior.  
Shaviro, supra note 113, at 4; see also Brunson, supra note 130, at 16 (“An economical-
ly efficient tax creates minimal economic distortions.  This means, essentially, that 
the imposition of a tax will not cause taxpayers to alter their behavior.”). 
 133 See Shaviro, supra note 113, at 2.  Shaviro notes that one of the principal prob-
lems associated with the C corporation taxation regime is “that it distorts the choice 
between retaining and distributing corporate earnings,” but he claims this “is a func-
tion of the realization doctrine rather than double taxation and would persist under 
some prominent [corporate] integration proposals.”  Id.  Nevertheless, for purposes 
of the article he “accept[s] the conventional academic view that tax-penalizing equi-
ty-financed corporate investment is inefficient.”  Id. at 51.  Shaviro identifies four 
corporate tax biases that affect efficiency: consequences of corporate versus noncor-
porate entity choice, debt versus equity financing, distributions versus retention of 
earnings, and the form of distributions.  See SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at 25–41; see also 
Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken?,” 28 VA. TAX REV. 341, 345 (2008) 
(“The existence of a separate corporate tax has long been criticized as causing eco-
nomic distortions. . . .  Significantly, the corporate tax tends to penalize investment 
in corporate rather than noncorporate form and to favor debt over equity.”). 
 134 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Weisbach, supra note 16, at 1651–52.  Weisbach proposes that the 
debt/equity distinction should be made in terms of efficiency, which he defines in 
terms of minimizing deadweight loss or “the loss in value to consumers in excess of 
the revenue raised by the government.”  Id. at 1651.  As an example, he questions 
whether the current doctrine that treats Monthly Income Preferred Stock (MIPS) as 
debt for income tax purposes has the effect of shifting issuance from debt to MIPS 
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form, the proposal nevertheless does offer some efficiency gains, but 
primarily from its simplification of the classification puzzle.
136
 
4. Vertical Equity 
The vertical equity principle proposes that tax burdens should 
be borne in accordance with ability to pay and that the rates of tax 
should be progressive.
137
  It is redistributive in nature.
138
  It is often 
stated that corporate income taxes are ultimately paid by individu-
als,
139
 but it is unclear which individuals (shareholders, labor, or cus-
tomers) bear those taxes.
140
  If corporate income taxes are borne sole-
ly by shareholders, then the impact of a “tighter” shareholder loan 
classification rule could increase the tax burdens of shareholders.  If 
the shareholders of closely held corporations in particular (as they 
are the corporations principally impacted by shareholder loans) are 
higher income taxpayers, then the proposed test could increase the 
 
(where the “creditors” have fewer rights) or from equity to MIPS.  Id. at 1674.  If it is 
the latter, then he argues that the result is likely to be inefficient.  Id.  If shareholder 
loans bear few other non-tax consequences, then it would seem that simply increas-
ing the corporate tax burden through an improved classification test would not nec-
essarily be inefficient. 
 136 See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing simplicity and administrability gains). 
 137 See ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 129, at 9 (“[V]ertical equity is creating an 
appropriate differential in burdens for people in unlike circumstances.”); J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its Interna-
tional Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 453 (2008) (“taxpayers with unequal incomes 
should pay amounts of tax which are sufficiently unequal to fairly reflect the differ-
ences in their incomes”).  
 138 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 111, at 10–22 (discussing progressive taxation 
and historical redistribution in the context of a consumption tax); Winchester, supra 
note 111, at 131 (“When scholars ask whether a tax is fair or equitable, they generally 
focus on the distribution of the tax burden.”). 
 139 See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 77 (“[A] tax on the income from 
corporations will be spread to the recipients of all types of capital income as funds 
that otherwise would have been invested in corporations flow into the noncorporate 
sector.”); Shaviro, supra note 112, at 431 (“Corporations figure only indirectly in the 
distributional story, via the effect of the corporate tax on whichever individuals bear 
it.”). 
 140 See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at 55–71 (discussing the debate over incidence 
issue); id. at 70 (“Thus, while the debate about the incidence of the corporate tax is 
ongoing and unlikely to be resolved definitively any time soon, it does appear to be 
trending strongly toward the view that labor rather than capital bears the largest 
share of the burden.”); Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate In-
come Tax Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 629–34 (discussing the incidence of 
the corporate income tax); Burke, supra note 133, at 344 (“While the ultimate inci-
dence of the corporate tax remains hotly contested, traditional analysis generally as-
sumes that the burden is borne by all owners of capital, rather than solely by corpo-
rate shareholders.”).   
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progressiveness of the federal income tax,
141
 but this is not a central 
aim of the proposed test. 
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED TEST 
Plumb briefly addresses the shortcomings of considering the 
availability of third-party financing as a classification factor, but only 
after first describing it as “[t]he acid test of the economic reality of a 
purported debt.”
142
  Plumb’s account of the judiciary’s application of 
the arm’s length test suggests that the judiciary has not been doctri-
nally consistent or rigorous, instead bending the test in favor of tax-
payers.
143
  This Article consequently proposes that the Service, by ex-
ercising its regulatory authority under § 385, add to the rigor of the 
debt/equity classification analysis by adopting a third-party lender 
standard as the primary test.  The objections of Plumb and others, 
however, must be considered. 
A. Identifying an Appropriate Hypothetical Lender 
Plumb argues that applying such a test is difficult because differ-
ent creditors have different risk appetites.
144
  Consequently, the test 
must be “whether ‘no responsible banker or businessman’ would 
have made such a loan, at least without the inducement of a substan-
tial stake in the enterprise.”
145
  This observation is not relevant to the 
proposed third-party test, which would use any relevant lender to es-
tablish the standard. 
Plumb, however, suggests that if independent parties would have 
made the loan with a profit-participation interest, then shareholder 
financing on the same terms should be valid, with shareholdings 
representing the profit-participation interest.
146
  Plumb admits that 
the “participatory financing would itself have to be subjected to the 
 
 141 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 133, at 344 (stating that “[b]ecause aggregate capital 
ownership is more concentrated among higher-income taxpayers than labor income 
or consumption, the corporate tax may be viewed as contributing to overall progres-
sivity” and suggesting that “[t]he corporate tax would appear even more progressive 
if the burden were allocated entirely to shareholders, since this group is more afflu-
ent than owners of capital as a whole”). 
 142 Plumb, supra note 7, at 530. 
 143 Id. at 533–34. 
 144 Id. at 531 (quoting C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 649, 651 
(1968)). 
 145 Id. (quoting Wood Pres. Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 
1965)). 
 146 Id. n.957. 
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test of economic reality if the corporation is inadequately capita-
lized.”
147
  Plumb slices this issue too fine.  The presence of a participa-
tion interest in profits, one of the hallmarks of an equity investment, 
would muddle the third-party test.  For purposes of a third-party test 
with any promise, certain direct or indirect profit-participations must 
be ignored; the third-party lender must only consider a loan without 
convertibility into equity or any participation in profits of the enter-
prise.  The convertibility feature would be ignored in determining 
whether a third-party lender would otherwise extend the loan without 
the convertibility feature.
148
  If the convertibility feature were of signif-
icant value to the hypothetical lender in its decision to extend the 
loan on its terms (which includes the interest rate charged), then ig-
noring convertibility would produce a negative response to the ques-
tion of whether a hypothetical lender would otherwise extend the 
loan.  The proposed test asks whether the hypothetical lender would 
extend the loan “in substantially the same manner.”
149
  The substan-
tiality component would add some flexibility to the inquiry, but in 
some cases not enough to overcome the impact of the loss of the 
convertibility feature. 
B. Discrimination Against Small Businesses 
Plumb also argues that “to give conclusive effect to the corpora-
tion’s inability to obtain outside credit would unfairly discriminate 
against small business which, although meeting abstract credit stan-
dards, may lack ready access to financial markets.”
150
  Plumb notes 
that because of this argument, the courts have tended to apply “a sort 
of reasonable man test, based not upon the actual availability of out-
side credit to the corporation but upon comparability to the general 
standards of the financial community, of which the actual failure of 
the corporation’s efforts to borrow may be evidentiary.”
151
  This 
statement presents two fundamental issues.  One, the process of 
quantifying the arm’s length standard, is discussed in the prior sec-
 
 147 Id. at 531. 
 148 To deny debt status due to convertibility status alone would unduly limit cor-
porations’ flexibility in designing their financial structure and could otherwise be 
undesirable.  See infra note 210 and accompanying text.  But ignoring the convertibil-
ity factor as the proposed test suggests will, in most cases, change the incentives of 
the hypothetical lender’s bargain such that no hypothetical lender would extend the 
loan on those conditions.   
 149 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 150 Plumb, supra note 7, at 531. 
 151 Id. at 532.  
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tion.
152
  This Article now addresses the other issue, the impact of an 
arm’s length standard on closely held businesses in particular. 
Plumb is not alone in making the claim that adopting an arm’s 
length test would have an adverse impact on small businesses by limit-
ing their use of shareholder debt.  In discussions of debt/equity clas-
sification, one sees this argument couched in terms of “discrimina-
tion” against small businesses, which do not have the same degree of 
access to capital markets as larger companies.
153
  But an arm’s length 
test requires only a nonshareholder lender, not necessarily public 
capital markets.  Still, many private lenders may not advance money 
to small businesses in exchange for a fixed return because the busi-
nesses are simply too risky.  And many traditional institutional lend-
ers, such as banks, will not make such loans—again, because the 
businesses are simply too risky.  The Small Business Administration 
loan guarantee program was created to address some of these bor-
rowing needs, and the loan default statistics bear out the risks in-
volved.
154
  While to some the “discrimination” tag suggests unfairness, 
it is simply a reflection of a sobering reality that the owners of risky 
businesses often need to inject more equity into the business, rather 
than substitute debt from anyone.
155
  While that might be the case for 
 
 152 See supra Part IV.B. 
 153 See William M. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: “Thin Capitaliza-
tion” and Related Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1, 33 (1960) (arguing that an all-or-nothing 
approach to debt classification may have a discriminatory effect); Gibson, supra note 
33, at 488 (“[T]he ability of the corporation to secure outside financing [should] be 
given little weight, if any, in the debt/equity analysis.  First, use of this factor may 
unduly limit the availability of capital to small, closely held corporations.”). 
 154 See, e.g., Veronique de Rugy, Axe the SBA—Pro: Gratuitous Crutch, THE DEBATE 
ROOM (BUS. WK.), June 22, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/ 
archives/2007/06/axe_the_sba.html (“Default rates on SBA loans are roughly 17% 
as opposed to 1.5% for FDIC-insured bank loans and 4.3% for credit card loans.”).  
The Small Business Administration program guarantee traditionally did not cover 
the entire loan, such that the originating bank was exposed to some risk of loss; how-
ever, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 502, 
123 Stat. 115, 152 (2009), temporarily increased the guaranteed portion up to ninety 
percent for certain small business loans. 
 155 See Richard B. Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corpora-
tion and Its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L. REV. 251, 261 (1968).   
The most theoretically effective means of assuming equal treatment 
among corporations would be to require that the shareholders of 
closely held corporations put in sufficient equity capital to enable them 
to obtain outside financing for their remaining needs.  Any argument 
that this would force close corporations, particularly those beginning 
new businesses, to exist at the mercy of unfriendly creditors only sup-
ports the assertion that there is no point at which pro rata shareholder 
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many closely held businesses, there will be those who could qualify 
for third-party financing but nevertheless choose to pursue share-
holder financing.
156
  The proposed third-party test would permit that. 
Nevertheless, courts apparently understand the potentially ad-
verse consequences of rigorously applying an arm’s length test to 
closely held businesses and dutifully recite that it is considered as on-
ly one of several factors.
157
  This could reflect an unspoken deference 
toward closely held businesses.
158
  On the other hand, both the multi-
factor doctrinal test that courts currently apply and the proposed 
arm’s length test would often produce the same result.
159
  Consider 
 
loans are really debt investments.  In a sense, allowance of the interest 
deduction on loans extended by shareholders on a pro rata basis dis-
criminates against widely held corporations, who must obtain funds at 
arm’s length from potentially hostile sources.   
Id. 
 156 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra Part II. 
 158 As compared with public companies, closely held corporations enjoy certain 
tax benefits, which are not generally limited by the “size,” i.e., wealth or income, of 
their shareholders.  First, as discussed infra text accompanying note 164, many can 
avoid the corporate income tax altogether by adopting the limited liability company 
or S corporation structure.  Second, due to the overlap of the shareholder and man-
ager classes, closely held corporations can mitigate the corporate tax burden to a 
larger degree by paying salaries rather than dividends.  Third, the corporate income 
tax rates are mildly progressive, such that low amounts of taxable income incur a 
marginal tax rate as low as fifteen percent, as compared with thirty-five percent for 
corporations with taxable income in excess of $10,000,000.  See I.R.C. § 11(b) (2006).  
Fourth, the loss on worthlessness of public stock is generally treated as a capital loss, 
while losses on certain small business stock can be treated as ordinary losses.  Compare 
id. § 165(g), with id. § 1244.  Fifth, $5000 of organizational expenditures can be de-
ducted in the year the corporation begins business, but amounts in excess of that 
must be amortized over 180 months.  See id. § 248.  The $5000 de minimis amount 
which is most favorable to small corporations is reduced by the amount that total or-
ganizational expenditures exceed $50,000.  See id.  Sixth, “small” corporations with 
less than $7,500,000 in gross receipts are exempt from the alternative minimum tax.  
See id. § 55(e)(1)(A).  This list is not exhaustive.  The courts’ reluctance to apply the 
“acid test” of a third-party lender may also demonstrate their reluctance to do so for 
other reasons, such as a lack of confidence in the test, reluctance to cede the discre-
tion they enjoy under the current doctrine, or simple blind adherence to precedent. 
 159 See Segel v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 816, 834 (1987) (finding advances to be equity).   
     Thus, the ultimate issue under Fin Hay is measurement of the trans-
actions by objective tests of economic reality, and the touchstone of 
economic reality is whether an outside lender would have made the 
payments in the same form and on the same terms.  If the sharehold-
ers’ payments were far more speculative than what an outsider would 
make, the payments would be loans in name only. 
Id. at 828 (citations omitted); see also Austin Vill., Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741, 
745–46 (6th Cir. 1970) (“The shareholders were unable to obtain outside financing 
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the Tax Court’s language in Lease v. Commissioner,
160
 a case in which 
the purported loan was treated as an equity contribution. 
 The ultimate question, however, is not so much whether a third 
party would have made the loan, which would almost invariably 
be an insurmountable obstacle to debt characterization as applied 
to a startup corporation . . . .  The question is whether, on the ba-
sis of the facts known when the stockholder made the advance, he 
could reasonably expect the corporation to repay the loan in ac-
cordance with terms in line with those generally prevailing in the 
business community. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . No reasonable creditor would have been comfortable mak-
ing a loan to a corporation without any assets, capital, or contrac-
tually committed investors.  Petitioner’s situation is another sad 
case of a promoter trying to start a business that could not justify 
an indebtedness on any arm’s-length standard because its pros-
pects were so speculative and its tangible and intangible assets so 
insubstantial. 
 . . . . 
 Although a negative answer to whether a commercial lender 
would have lent Montex the funds when petitioner did is insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to treat purported debt as equity, it does 
bear on whether petitioner’s expectations of repayment were rea-
sonable.  Inasmuch as Montex had no other capital or assets at 
the time petitioner made the advances, it would in all likelihood 
have been impossible for Montex to qualify for a loan from a 
commercial lender.  In addition, Montex was going to engage in 
the risky business of gold mining, which it had not yet started.  It 
is doubtful that a reasonable creditor would have lent Montex the 
funds it needed, solely on the basis of an oral commitment from a 
foreign investor.
161
 
Likewise, in Cerand & Co. v. Commissioner, finding that the tax-
payer’s advances were equity contributions, the Tax Court observed: 
 
for development of the land and decided therefore to invest their own funds accord-
ing to a plan which made repayment contingent upon the success of the venture.  
This is a classic example of an investment of risk capital.”); cf. supra note 128 (listing 
cases that could have benefited from greater evidence of third-party lending practic-
es).  Compare Piggy Bank Stations, Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 299, 305–06 
(1982), aff’d, 755 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1985) (corporation was unable to obtain third-
party financing; result was equity characterization), with Estate of Mixon v. United 
States, 464 F.2d 394, 410–11 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that there was “no evidence that 
the Bank made any unsuccessful attempts at further outside financing,” that “all such 
efforts proved successful,” and that debt characterization was therefore appropriate). 
 160 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121 (1993). 
 161 Id. at 1125–27 (citations omitted). 
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Though no outside financing was sought, it is reasonable to as-
sume that an outside financier would not have accepted similar 
credit terms: an open, unsecured line of credit with no set interest 
rate, no set payment schedule, and no fixed maturity date to 
three companies with no financial history and no capital assets.
162
 
On remand from the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, the Tax Court reaffirmed its result and further stated: 
A third-party creditor would not have advanced funds to the sister 
corporations at a preferred rate (less than 10 percent), consider-
ing the fact that they were startup companies without a business 
performance record, assets, security, guaranties, etc.
163
 
The potential impact on small business may be overstated due to 
the increasing use of passthrough entities like the S corporation and 
the limited liability company (LLC).
164
  With both entities, the use of 
shareholder or member debt is not as critical from an income tax 
standpoint because there is no need to mitigate double taxation as 
there is in C corporations.
165
  Consequently, the impact would primar-
ily fall on existing small business corporations that cannot,
166
 or 
 
 162 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 933, 935 (1998). 
 163 Cerand & Co. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 755, 758 (2001). 
 164 See Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1055, 1070 (2000) (“Allowing small private firms to have both limited liability 
and pass-through treatment has taken pressure off the debt-equity distinction in the 
context of closely held businesses since many small businesses are not subject to the 
double corporate tax.”).  In 2006, 2,947,100 partnership income tax returns were 
filed, which would include returns filed by limited liability companies treated as 
partnerships for federal income tax purposes.  See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 12: NUMBER OF BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS, BY SIZE 
OF BUSINESS FOR INCOME YEARS, 1990–2007 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
taxstats/article/0,,id=175843,00.html.  In 2005, 1,974,961 C corporation returns were 
filed, with 936,015 of those returns not reporting net income; however, more than 
ninety-six percent of the total income tax after credits was paid by corporations with 
at least $500,000 in income tax after credits, and those corporations comprised less 
than one percent of total returns filed.  See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., RETURNS OF ACTIVE CORPORATIONS, OTHER THAN FORMS 1120S, 1120-
REIT, AND 1120-RIC: TABLE 22: NUMBER OF RETURNS AND SELECTED TAX ITEMS, BY SIZE 
OF TOTAL INCOME TAX AFTER CREDITS (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=112834,00.html. 
 165 S corporation shareholder debt serves several other purposes.  A shareholder’s 
share of losses cannot exceed the shareholder’s basis in stock and any indebtedness 
of the S corporation to the shareholder.  See I.R.C. § 1366(d) (2006).  Further, the 
income tax rules governing payment of interest and the repayment of principal are 
less complicated than the income tax rules governing the treatment of S corporation 
distributions.  See id. § 1368.  
 166 S corporation status is unavailable if the corporation has more than 100 share-
holders, has shareholders that are not individuals (with some exceptions for estates 
GAZUR (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:15 PM 
2010] AN ARM’S LENGTH SOLUTION 451 
 
choose not to, elect S corporation status and on new ventures that 
choose to incorporate rather than establish as an LLC.
167
  Of course, 
the movement to pass-through taxation entities could abate or re-
verse in the future if individual income tax rates increase significantly 
in comparison with C corporation rates, which could arise from 
changes to the individual income tax rates, the C corporation income 
tax rates, or both. 
New ventures that still choose to incorporate as C corporations 
in spite of the double taxation that accompanies such status can be of 
some significance.  Companies that expect to launch an initial public 
offering (IPO) of stock may choose this status.
168
  Start-up companies 
that expect to attract venture capital investment may also choose this 
status.
169
  Both pre-IPO and start-up companies will likely not be as fi-
nancially mature as public companies, such that the imposition of a 
third-party lender test may produce more characterizations as equity 
 
and certain trusts and tax-exempt organizations), have nonresident alien sharehold-
ers, or have more than one class of stock (other than differences in voting rights).  
Id. § 1361(b)(1), (c)(4).  In addition, certain corporations, such as insurance com-
panies, are ineligible.  Id. § 1361(b)(2)(B). 
 167 C corporation status might be attractive to shareholders who are determined 
to defer individual federal or state income taxes.  Although the details are beyond 
the scope of this Article, the formation of a C corporation in a state that imposes no 
corporate or individual income taxes may present some current advantages to share-
holders who reside in a state that imposes high individual income taxes.  Of course, 
federal limits on this practice must be considered.  See, e.g., id. § 531 (imposition of 
accumulated earnings tax); id. § 541 (imposition of personal holding company tax).  
 168 Public companies cannot escape C corporation status because they will exceed 
the 100 shareholder limit of S corporations, id. § 1361(b)(1)(A), and because public 
trading of partnership or LLC interests will invoke I.R.C. § 7704 in most cases, with 
the result of imposing C corporation taxation.  Public companies do have the option 
of forming in a foreign jurisdiction to avoid a U.S. corporate income tax on foreign 
sourced earnings.  
 169 See Steven D. Bortnick & John I. Forry, Structuring International Private Equity 
Investments in the People’s Republic of China, 126 BANKING L.J. 195, 196 (2009).  Venture 
capital transactions, like other private equity transactions, are made up of funds that 
pool their money from a number of investors.  Id.  These funds are managed by 
management companies that receive compensation in the form of an asset-backed 
fee plus an interest in the fund.  Id.  Both institutional and individual investors may 
make private equity investments.  Id.  Venture capitalists also typically gain an equity 
interest in the companies in which they invest in addition to the debt investment.  Id.  
The partners in the fund may be tax exempt: dividends and interest received from a 
portfolio C corporation remain tax-exempt, but income from a pass-through portfo-
lio entity can result in the imposition of the unrelated business income tax.  See gener-
ally I.R.C. § 501(a) (general tax exemption for qualified organizations); id. § 501(b) 
(tax on unrelated business income); id. § 512 (unrelated business taxable income 
defined).   
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than as debt.
170
  But many of the investors in these companies are 
seeking robust equity-like returns, even if the investments are dressed 
as debt.
171
  The arm’s length test simply reveals the economic reality 
of the structure, which is equity-return driven.  Certainly, there will 
be start-up companies that may be so successful that the third-party 
lender test will be satisfied.  That was apparently the case with the 
taxpayer in Delta Plastics, Inc.
172
  Nevertheless, considering the as-
sumed role of start-up companies as agents of innovation,
173
 one 
could expect criticism of the proposed test from that perspective.
174
 
 
 170 James H. Ball, Jr. & Andrew F. Fowler, Bumps on the Road to an IPO: Structuring 
Provisions to Anticipate Issues in Pre-IPO Convertible Bonds, WALL ST. LAW., Dec. 2007, at 
1, 1 (“In some cases, even aggressive hedge funds specializing in venture capital in-
vestments can be unwilling to provide traditional debt financing to private compa-
nies in the development stage. . . .”).   
 171 The financing structure of a pre-IPO company may include multiple classes of 
stock, convertible debt, debt with detachable warrants, and so forth.  Id. at 1–3.  Con-
vertible debt is particularly popular for pre-IPO companies, especially in the later de-
velopment stage, because investors are willing to trade interest now for potentially 
unlimited equity upside associated with conversion of pre-IPO convertible bonds into 
shares of a public company down the road.  Id. at 3.  Likewise, a portfolio company 
dealing with venture capital investors may also offer those types of investments as well 
as convertible preferred stock.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Under-
standing Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 874, 875 (2003) (“[O]verwhelmingly, venture capitalists make their in-
vestments through convertible preferred stock.”). 
 172 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940 (2003).  The facts of the Tax Court opinion suggest that 
the founders of Delta Plastics, Inc. had prior experience and success in plastics man-
ufacturing.  See id. at 941.  The new venture was not launched until the expiration of 
a covenant not to compete granted in connection with the sale of a prior plastics ven-
ture.  Id.  Experienced management, technological expertise, knowledge of markets, 
and prior experience in the same business of the start-up present good odds of suc-
cess. 
 173 See, e.g., Reid Hoffman, Let Start-ups Bail Us Out, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at 
A13 (“Small companies represent 99.7 percent of all employer firms, Commerce De-
partment data show.  They pay nearly 45 percent of U.S. private payroll and have 
generated 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually over the past decade.”).  Past 
start-up companies that are now successful include Microsoft, MTV, CNN, FedEx, In-
tel, Hewlett Packard, and Burger King.  Id.  Several of these companies developed 
products and ideas that were innovative at the time and revolutionized their respec-
tive industries.  President Obama has also commented on how small businesses pro-
vide the innovation that helps the U.S. lead the global economy.  Obama Lauds Small 
Firms, Innovation, TECH DAILY DOSE (NAT’L J.), March 16, 2009, 
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2009/03/obama-lauds-small-firms-
innova.php. 
 174 Although the overall impact of C corporation taxation was much more pro-
nounced for small businesses at the time the § 385 regulations were proposed (for 
example, the limited liability company had not yet emerged as a choice of entity), it 
has been noted that the regulations’ perceived negative impact on closely held busi-
nesses contributed to their demise.  See, e.g., 2 STEFAN F. TUCKER, TAX PLANNING FOR 
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Corporate subsidiaries are generally “closely held,”
175
 and the 
proposed test would be valuable in classifying the parent company’s 
capital infusions.
176
 
C. Shareholder Guaranteed Third-Party Debt 
Finally, Plumb touches upon the issue of shareholder guarantees 
of third-party debt,
177
 which is a troublesome issue that clouds applica-
tion of a third-party lender test because a third-party lender is part of 
the transaction; however, the third-party lender may have been in-
duced, perhaps almost entirely, to make the loan as a result of the 
shareholder guarantees.  Existing doctrine tends to benignly treat 
shareholder-guaranteed debt as debt unless the corporation is so thin 
that the lender is principally relying on the guarantee.
178
  Conse-
quently, this type of structure is a common income tax planning rec-
ommendation, as it obfuscates what might otherwise have been a 
clear shareholder loan to the corporation. 
A promising solution is to phrase the arm’s length test in terms 
of whether a third party would make the loan in question without 
 
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 26:04 (2009) (stating that the regulations “were gener-
ally not acceptable to small business or the real estate industry”); John Lee et al., Res-
tating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for “Rough Justice” Regulations (Part 
Two), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1483, 1512 (1997); Charles R. Taylor, Classifying Share-
holder Advances to a Closely Held Corporation as Debt or Stock: Guidelines for the Befuddled 
Practitioner, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 641, 643 (1984) (“The proposed regulations under sec-
tion 385 were deemed to be too lengthy and complex by numerous small business 
experts and members of the bar, and thus were withdrawn by the Treasury in August 
of 1983, with no hint as to when, if ever, another draft would be forthcoming.”). 
 175 For example, in 2002, the largest 100 American multinational corporations 
owned an average of 187 subsidiaries,  In this group, an average of 179 subsidiaries 
were owned by their parent companies in amounts of at least ninety-five percent.  See 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, § 1.03, at 1-9 (2d. ed. 
2005 & Supp. 2009). 
 176 See generally Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598 (1998) 
(debt status denied for loans between related, but not directly affiliated corpora-
tions); Litton Business Sys. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 367, 379 (1973) (parent company ad-
vances to subsidiary held to be valid debt, in part because third-party funding was 
available); David B. Friedel, Asymmetries in Taxation of Debt in and Outside Consolidated 
Groups, CORP. TAX’N, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 3 (discussing traditional lending arrange-
ments of parent companies and subsidiaries). 
 177 Plumb, supra note 7, at 534–35. 
 178 The leading case is Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th 
Cir. 1972).  For a list of citations to the cases addressing this issue see 1 BITTKER & 
EUSTICE, supra note 2, ¶ 4.23[3] n.261.  See also David S. Miller, Federal Income Tax 
Consequences of Guarantees: A Comprehensive Framework for Analysis, 48 TAX LAW. 103, 
134–39 (1994) (discussing the doctrine of guarantees as equity). 
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shareholder guarantees.  In Stinnett’s Pontiac Service, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, the Eleventh Circuit found the taxpayer’s advances to be equity 
contributions.
179
  With respect to the corporate borrower’s ability to 
secure outside financing, the court observed that 
[i]n this case, evidence exists to show that [the borrower] could 
not secure credit from outside sources unless the [borrower’s] 
shareholders guaranteed the extension of credit.  Yet [the lender] 
made advances to [the borrower] without securing personal 
guarantees from [the borrower’s] shareholders.  [The lender] 
failed to act as would a reasonable creditor, and this factor also 
indicates that the advances were contributions to capital.
180
 
An arm’s length test, which ignores shareholder guarantees as 
an inducement to lend, shifts the focus to the creditworthiness
181
 of 
the corporation.  In a similar vein, the March 24, 1980, proposed 
regulations offered a test that considered the likelihood of payment 
of the obligation by the corporation. 
[If] it is not reasonable (at the time of the guarantee) to expect 
that the loan can be enforced against the corporation according 
to its terms, then (at the time of the guarantee) the loan is treated 
as made to the shareholder, and the shareholder is treated as 
making a contribution to the capital of the corporation.
182
 
Although the likelihood of payment by the corporation is the 
basis of the third-party lender’s decision to lend funds, the arm’s 
length test would need to account for the possibility that guarantees 
are required for other purposes.
183
  For example, the preamble to the 
 
 179 730 F.2d 634, 640 (l1th Cir. 1984). 
 180 Id.  Contra Nestle Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 682, 702 (1995) 
(advances to subsidiary treated as debt because the court was “satisfied that petition-
er, as a separate entity, could have obtained the full amount from some combination 
of private lenders and commercial banking sources”). 
 181 Banks look at several factors when considering the creditworthiness of a small 
business.  The use of credit scores for small business lending, however, is a more re-
cent phenomenon.  CHARLES D. COWAN & ADRIAN M. COWAN, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., A 
SURVEY BASED ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION USE OF CREDIT SCORING FOR 
SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 1 (2006).  The majority of banks that do consider the credit 
score look at the score of the owner as the key metric.  Id. at 7–8.  The majority of 
banks listed cash flow as the most important factor, with collateral as the next most 
important factor.  Id. at 9. 
 182 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-11(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18972 (Mar. 24, 1980). 
 183 It was the author’s experience in law practice that banks would invariably de-
mand a personal guarantee from the shareholder and the shareholder’s spouse for 
closely held business loans, seemingly without first engaging in meaningful credit 
analysis of the corporate borrower.  It is just “prudent lending practice” to demand as 
much as possible.  The guarantee requirement could be waived, however, if the bor-
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proposed regulations notes that a guarantee may provide the creditor 
with assurance that the corporation will not dissipate assets by trans-
fers to shareholders.
184
 
D. The Application of the Third-Party Test Beyond Shareholder Loans 
The greatest promise for the third-party lender test lies in its ap-
plication to shareholder loans in closely held corporations.  In other 
contexts, such as where there are a number of willing and competing 
third-party lenders who will satisfy the test, the test is somewhat hol-
low in terms of distinguishing loans from equity.  The third-party 
lender test also ignores the presence of equity interests in the bor-
rower or convertibility into equity of the borrower, which makes it an 
inflexible test with respect to more complex hybrid instruments.  The 
shortcomings of the third-party lender test in these respects are brief-
ly discussed below. 
 
rower was stubborn and well-advised, and the corporation met certain capitalization 
requirements.  In fact, lenders require personal guarantees from their small business 
borrowers in all but the most unusual circumstances.  Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Se-
cured Debt in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1997).  One reason for this is 
that borrowers tend to have an undue preference for risk when they are able to shift 
the risk of losses to the lenders, but a personal guaranty mitigates this problem by 
increasing the risk that the borrower will feel any losses personally.  Id. at 22.  Lend-
ers also want the individual to be as financially committed to the company as they 
are.  Id. at 24.  In fact, these factors are so important that lenders insist on a guaranty 
even if it will add nothing to the credit strength of the borrower.  Id. at 23–24.  But see 
Miller, supra note 178, at 138. 
     If no creditors are willing to loan funds at any interest rate to the 
debtor without a guarantee, it would appear as if the market does not 
have sufficient confidence that any loan to the debtor will be repaid, 
and thus, the guarantee represents in substance a debt obligation of 
the guarantor.  Nevertheless, if the market is flawed and in a particular 
situation lenders always require personal guarantees, the unavailability 
of “non-guarantee” creditors should not be dispositive. 
Id.   
 184 Pmbl., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-11, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18962 (“[T]he creditor 
may want to provide against the possibility that the corporation will transfer assets to 
its shareholders (by paying them dividends, salaries, etc.).  When shareholders guar-
antee a loan for this . . . reason, the guarantee is a substitute for detailed protective 
covenants.”).  The easiest case would be a situation where the shareholders have 
much of their personal wealth committed to the corporate borrower and conse-
quently, the guarantee is not worth much, aside from the “play honestly” aspects al-
luded to by the Preamble.  In that event the proposed test would assess the likelihood 
of a loan based on the corporation’s creditworthiness and prospects alone. 
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1. Straight Debt Instruments 
An arm’s length test would have less outcome determinative 
force in its application to “straight” debt instruments issued by cre-
ditworthy corporations, particularly public corporations, the financial 
standing of which could permit the structuring of capital contribu-
tions as debt or equity in response to a number of factors, including 
investor demand,
185
 corporate income tax planning, corporate 
finance considerations,
186
 financial reporting consequences,
187
 and 
regulatory requirements.
188
  It would seem likely that putative debt ob-
 
 185 Some investors prefer equity treatment due to income tax preferences for divi-
dends.  Corporate shareholders enjoy a dividend received deduction.  See I.R.C. § 243 
(2006).  Dividends received by individuals can be taxed at the same rates as capital 
gain income.  Id. § 1(h)(11); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at 89–99 (discussing the 
implications of capital finance theory and investor choices, indeed elections, between 
debt (which is essentially taxed at the investor’s rate because the return is deductible 
by the corporation) and equity (which is essentially taxed at the corporation’s rate 
because the return is not deductible by the corporation)).   
 186 Generally, the amount, timing, and riskiness of the expected cash flows com-
bined with the investor’s assessment of the riskiness of the cash flows and the inves-
tor’s willingness to bear risk will generate the investor’s required rate of return (min-
imum rate of return necessary to attract an investor to purchase or hold a security).  
ARTHUR J. KEOWN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: THE LOGIC AND PRACTICE OF 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 208 (4th ed. 2002).  The return must be great enough to 
compensate investors for the perceived risk in the asset’s future cash flows.  Id.  Sev-
eral factors concerning the asset, such as whether it is an unsecured debenture ra-
ther than a secured bond, if there is subordination, whether the bond is a low cou-
pon or zero bond, the term, remedies upon default, etc., will impact the investor’s 
required rate of return.  See id. at 200–05. 
 187 Very generally, distributions treated as interest for financial accounting pur-
poses will reduce reported earnings while dividends will not.  Schizer, supra note 117, 
at 1324.  On the other hand, equity instruments, as well as convertible securities, may 
dilute earnings per share by creating more shares.  SCHROEDER, supra note 118, at 
367.  Capital contributions treated as debt impact financial ratios (such as the debt-
to-equity ratio) and credit ratings.  See generally id. at 505.  Thus, as debt increases, the 
market perceives the risk associated with investing in the company as also increasing.  
Id.  Since investors and security analysts monitor company performance through the 
use of financial ratios, it is important that the corporation maintain favorable ratios 
compared to previous years, competitors, industry averages, or benchmarks.  Id. at 
233.  In May 2003 the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards No. 150: Accounting for Certain Financial Instru-
ments with Characteristics of Both Liabilities and Equity; this statement is notable 
because it can require that mandatorily redeemable preferred stock be treated as a 
liability on the issuer’s balance sheet.  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING NO. 150 (May 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/ 
pdf/aop_FAS150.pdf. 
 188 In regulated sectors such as banking and investment businesses, the issuer may 
seek equity status for regulatory purposes to meet capital requirements.  The Federal 
Reserve System has adopted a minimum ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets to assess 
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ligations of creditworthy public corporations would infrequently fail a 
third-party lender test because third-party capital providers supply a 
market for such obligations, unlike closely held corporations where 
the shareholders and the lenders are often the same parties. 
As applied to public corporations, which would more likely have 
opportunities to attract capital through debt or equity infusions, a 
“form and labels” test
189
 in tandem with the arm’s length lender test 
would produce a largely elective regime with respect to “straight” 
debt that is not directly or indirectly convertible into equity.
190
  In-
deed, the withdrawn § 385 regulations produced a similar result by 
treating publicly traded corporations gently with respect to straight 
debt, and such instruments not issued to principal shareholders were 
ordinarily classified as debt.
191
 
 This electivity would produce a more certain result, which 
would further the goals of compliance, simplicity, and administrabili-
 
the capital adequacy of bank holding companies.  A Wall Street Journal article re-
ported that 
hybrid securities became a vital funding tool for banks, boosting Tier 1 
capital ratios but costing less than true equity. . . .  
     . . . .  
     For investors, the bonds were considered debt.  For issuers, they 
were equity—under certain circumstances coupon payments can be 
deferred like dividends, and if the bonds aren’t called after 10 years, 
they generally remain outstanding in perpetuity.  As a result, they con-
tributed toward Tier 1 capital, a key reserve against losses. 
Richard Barley, Hybrids Laid Low by Crisis at Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at B10.  
Reportedly, U.S. and European bank regulators have encouraged the banks’ use of 
bonds (so-called “contingent convertibles”) that convert into equity in times of fi-
nancial exigency.  See David Henry, The Second Coming of “Safer” Securities, BUS. WK., 
Dec. 7. 2009, at 56, 56.  In Notice 94-47, described infra this Part, the Service identi-
fied as an additional consideration in debt or equity classification: “whether the in-
struments are intended to be treated as debt or equity for non-tax purposes, includ-
ing regulatory, rating agency, or financial accounting purposes.”  I.R.S. Notice 94-97, 
1994-1 C.B. 357.  Although there are drawbacks, some commentators have suggested 
that more conformity between the financial accounting rules (or results) and the tax 
rules (or results) is appropriate.  See generally John J. Ensminger, Concerto for Piano vs. 
Orchestra: Can Tax and Financial Accounting Harmonize on Hedges?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 23 
(2001); Yoram Keinan, Book Tax Conformity for Financial Instruments, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 
676 (2004); Shaviro, supra note 112. 
 189 The proposed test also incorporates the formal requirements of a written un-
conditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money 
in return for an adequate consideration in money or money’s worth, and to pay a 
fixed rate of interest.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 190 While convertible debt instruments are one matter, there is an administrability 
issue of whether a prohibition on indirect convertibility can be effectively applied in 
light of other opportunities to maintain a long position in the issuer’s stock.  
 191 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18963 (Mar. 24, 1980). 
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ty and would also lower transaction costs.
192
  Even if the line between 
debt and equity is more favorably predictable for public corporations, 
Congress could still continue to exercise its prerogative to address 
specific instances of perceived abuse.
193
  As discussed below, however, 
the classification of straight debt probably is not a significant issue for 
public corporations.  Instruments with contingent payments or con-
vertibility features present greater challenges.  Nevertheless, the pro-
posed test ignores the unreasonably long maturity aspect of the Ser-
vice’s position announced in Notice 94-47,
194
 its last major 
pronouncement in this area. 
In Notice 94-47, the Service stated that features of particular 
concern in the debt classification analysis included “long maturities 
with substantial equity characteristics.”
195
  Referring to its acquies-
cence in Monon Railroad v. Commissioner,
196
 which involved an instru-
ment with a 50-year term, the Service cautioned taxpayers that even 
with instruments of a term of less than 50 years, the case does not 
support debt classification if the instrument contains significant equi-
ty characteristics not present in that case.
197
  In that respect, while the 
 
 192 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 193 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) (2006) (limitations of interest expense deduction 
for certain high yield debt obligations); id. § 163(j) (limitation of interest expense 
deduction on certain thinly capitalized affiliates of foreign corporations); id. 
§ 163(l)(1)–(2) (limitations of interest expense deduction on certain debt instru-
ments payable in equity); id. § 279 (limitations of interest expense deduction on cer-
tain corporate acquisition debt). 
 194 I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  
 195 Id. 
 196 55 T.C. 345 (1970), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 3. 
 197 The Notice lists, in addition to convertibility, the following traditional equity 
factors:  
(a) whether there is an unconditional promise on the part of the issuer 
to pay a sum certain on demand or at a fixed maturity date that is in 
the reasonably foreseeable future; (b) whether holders of the instru-
ments possess the right to enforce the payment of principal and inter-
est; (c) whether the rights of the holders of the instruments are subor-
dinate to rights of general creditors; (d) whether the instruments give 
the holders the right to participate in the management of the issuer; 
(e) whether the issuer is thinly capitalized; (f) whether there is identity 
between holders of the instruments and stockholders of the issuer; 
[and] (g) the label placed upon the instruments by the parties . . . . 
I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  Factor (d) includes management participation.  
In comparison, the preamble to the March 24, 1980, proposed regulations stated that 
“[v]oting rights are not given independent weight under” the regulations and ob-
served that “[t]his treatment is not inconsistent with the case law.  It is difficult to 
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proposed arm’s length test dispenses with the unreasonably long ma-
turity concept, the “forms and labels” test and limitations on conver-
tibility effectively eliminate many of the otherwise “significant equity 
characteristics.” 
2. Hybrid Securities 
I.R.S. Notice 94-47 also singled out instruments that are manda-
torily redeemable with stock.  The prior holding in Revenue Ruling 
85-119,
198
 which treated as debt an obligation that was mandatorily 
convertible into equity (but which gave the holder a right to demand 
that the equity be sold and converted into cash) was limited to its 
facts.  The Notice indicated that instruments will be scrutinized 
where the right to elect cash is structured to ensure that the holder 
would choose the stock
199
 or where the instrument is nominally paya-
 
find a case in which voting rights are the decisive factor.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-
12, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18960 (March 24, 1980) (citing Plumb, supra note 7, at 447).   
 198 Rev. Rul. 85-119, 1985-2 C.B. 60.  The Service adopted a liberal debt classifica-
tion stance toward convertible debt in this ruling.  The obligations were issued by a 
regulated bank holding company to satisfy required capital requirements.  Id.  The 
obligations had a number of debt features.  The notes were issued in a public offer-
ing and would not be held proportionately to the issuer’s stock.  Id.  The notes were 
transferable and had a twelve-year maturity date.  Id.  Holders of the notes could not 
vote or participate in management, and interest was computed at a floating rate 
comparable to the market rate on similar instruments.  Id.  The issuer was not thinly 
capitalized, but the notes could not be accelerated but upon bankruptcy, insolvency, 
or reorganization of the issuer.  Id.  Consequently, the principal equity feature was 
that upon maturity, the issuer was unconditionally obligated to issue its common or 
perpetual preferred stock in an appraised amount equal to the notes’ principal 
amount.  Id.  Noteholders, however, could elect to receive the stock and have the is-
suer immediately sell the stock in a secondary offering.  Id. at 60–61. 
 199 Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40, which treated so-called “adjustable rate con-
vertible notes” (ARCNs) as equity, represented an extreme situation of such proba-
bility.  Although the holder paid $1000 for each note, at maturity the holder would 
receive only $600 cash or fifty shares of the issuer’s common stock.  Id.  As noted in 
the ruling, “[t]he ARCNs in this case are structured so that under most likely even-
tualities they will be converted into X common stock.”  Id.  “Because of the very high 
probability that all of the [ARCNs] issued will be converted into stock, the [ARCNs] 
do not in reality present a promise to pay a sum certain.”  Id.  In addition, the rate of 
“interest” was computed as an amount equal to the dividends paid on fifty shares of 
common stock plus two percent of the $1000 issue price of the note.  Id.  Conse-
quently, “more than 65 percent of the future annual yield may be discretionary based 
on the level of discretionary dividends paid on X common stock.”  Id.  Although the 
interest on the debt in Revenue Ruling 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69 was in part tied to the 
issuer’s earnings, the Service stated that it “was determinable according to a formula 
and did not float in tandem with discretionary common stock dividends.”  The Reve-
nue Ruling 83-98 “interest” was also “determinable according to a formula,” so that 
observation was of little consequence, but the direct linkage to common stock divi-
dends, as opposed to overall profit levels, was a significant distinguishing factor in 
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ble in cash but does not, in substance, give the holder the right to re-
ceive cash because, for example, the instrument is secured by the 
stock and is nonrecourse to the issuer.  The interest deductibility as-
pect was subsequently addressed by the addition of I.R.C. § 163(l) in 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
200
  The larger issue of whether an in-
strument is debt or equity for other purposes, however, is still im-
pacted by this position. 
Notice 94-47 did not focus on the role of contingent payments, 
although they were included in its general list of equity characteris-
tics.
201
  In comparison, the March 24, 1980, proposed regulations ad-
dressed this factor as part of its definition of a “hybrid” instrument.  
The regulations would have defined a “hybrid instrument” as “an in-
strument that is convertible into stock or one (such as an income 
bond or a participating bond) that provides for any contingent pay-
ment to the holder (other than a call premium).”
202
  Further, the 
regulations would have defined fixed interest payments as “interest at 
a definitely ascertainable rate[,] . . . due on definitely ascertainable 
dates[,] . . . [with] the holder’s right to receive interest when due (or 
within 90 days thereafter) . . . [un]impaired without the holder’s con-
sent.”
203
  The December 31, 1980, regulations refined “definitely as-
certainable” to include an invariable rate or a variable rate “deter-
mined according to an external standard that is not subject to the 
borrower’s control and that is not related to the success or failure of 
 
this inquiry for which certain facts, on the margin, make a difference.  The ARCN in 
Revenue Ruling 83-98 was reportedly inspired by the Service’s proposed § 385 regu-
lations, which would permit debt classification; the regulations were withdrawn soon 
after the promulgation of the ruling.   See, e.g., Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 40, at 
161 (“The clarity of the § 385 regulations made ARCNs possible; the withdrawal of 
the regulations and the warning shot of the revenue ruling stopped developments 
along the lines of ARCNs for almost a decade.”). 
 200 The overall arrangement would invoke this provision.  See I.R.C. § 163(l)(3)(C) 
(2006) (“For purposes of this paragraph, principal or interest shall be treated as re-
quired to be so paid, converted, or determined if it may be required at the option of 
the holder or a related party and there is a substantial certainty the option will be ex-
ercised.”).  While Notice 94-47 speaks to the broader debt or equity characterization 
of an instrument, the impact of I.R.C. § 163(l) is limited to denying an interest ex-
pense deduction on an instrument that is otherwise considered to qualify as debt.   
 201 See I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357. 
 202 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(f), 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18965 (Mar. 24, 1980); see 
also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(b), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18966 (“The equity features of an 
instrument are the right to convert it into stock and the right to contingent payments 
(other than a call premium).”). 
 203 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18966.   
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the borrower’s business or activities.”
204
  The December 31, 1980, reg-
ulations were more restrictive than prior revenue rulings in this re-
spect.
205
  The definition of fixed principal payments was similar: “A 
definitely ascertainable principal sum . . . payable on demand or due 
on definitely ascertainable dates . . . [and] the holder’s right to re-
ceive principal when due cannot be impaired without the holder’s 
consent.”
206
 
 In spite of the proposed regulations’ treatment of contingent 
payments, the Service’s continuing position following Notice 94-47 
with respect to interest deferral is apparently unspoken acquiescence. 
While Treasury has strenuously objected to characterizing long-
maturity obligations as debt, it has never objected to the interest 
deferral feature [of Monthly Income Preferred Shares (MIPS)]. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he effect of the Treasury pronouncements that were in-
terpreted as blessing MIPS as debt so long as the maturity was not 
overlong was to make it possible for a corporation to provide for 
 
 204 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4), 45 Fed. Reg. 86438, 86448 (Dec. 30, 1980). 
 205 In Revenue Ruling 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69, the Service ruled that the subordi-
nated debentures of a broker dealer were to be classified as debt in the face of many 
equity-like features. The debentures were subordinated to all creditors of the issuer.  
Id.  The debentures provided for a fixed rate of interest, but additional interest of 
one percent per annum would be payable on a contingent basis if a certain level of 
net profits were enjoyed by the issuer.  Id.  The Service’s response was that while the 
interest was dependent upon earnings, the additional interest was determined by a 
fixed formula and the decision whether to pay interest was not discretionary with the 
issuer.  Id. Although the Service did not speak in terms of whether a third-party lend-
er would have made a loan to the issuer, that appears to clearly be the case.  In the 
same year, the Tax Court addressed subordinated borrowings by another broker 
dealer in Copley v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 383, 386 (1968), finding that the 
“loans” were to be treated as capital contributions, thereby denying a bad debt loss to 
the lender.  The four-page opinion is somewhat cryptic, but it is reasonably clear 
from the record that the borrower could not have obtained the funds from an inde-
pendent lender.  See generally id.  The borrower was in financial trouble and underca-
pitalized, and the National Association of Securities Dealers and Securities and Ex-
change Commission required it to suspend operations until additional capital was 
obtained.  Id. at  384.  Even with the taxpayer’s “loans,” the borrower failed in the 
same year.  Id. 
 206 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18966.  The December 31, 
1980, regulations refined “definitely ascertainable” to include an invariable sum or a 
variable rate “determined according to an external standard that is not subject to the 
borrower’s control and that is not related to the success or failure of the borrower’s 
business or activities.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(ii)(B), 45 Fed. Reg. at 
86448. 
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limited deferral of interest payments in a security without imperil-
ing classification of the security as debt for tax purposes.
207
 
By insisting on a fixed payment obligation and limiting any di-
rect or indirect convertibility into equity, the arm’s length test pro-
posed by this Article would treat such instruments as equity.  The 
proposed regulations under § 385 recognized that this would not be a 
realistic solution, and they treated hybrid instruments as debt or eq-
uity based on the aggregate fair market value that was predominant 
of the two classes of interests.
208
  It was an all or nothing test, as the 
authority for Treasury to adopt regulations that bifurcate instruments 
was added later with the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1989.
209
  It also is questionable whether such an unforgiv-
ing treatment of convertible debt, as suggested by the proposed arm’s 
length test, is appropriate as a policy or doctrinal matter.
210
  Even if a 
strict fixed payment or convertibility limitation is embraced, it is 
doubtful whether that alone will be successful as an administrative 
 
 207 Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 40, at 170, 185; see also Humphreys, supra note 
14, at 1205 (“Deferral on debt instruments has been one of those unique features 
that gives the non-tax audience comfort but does not cause the tax advisor too much 
pain.”).  For a description of the terms of mandatory and optional deferral provisions 
plus the reasons why the income tax consequences are considered to be benign, see 
id. at 1204–07.  Notably, I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 99-10-046 (Nov. 16, 1998) approved 
payment postponement provisions of a MIPS arrangement, although ostensibly ap-
plying the guidelines of Notice 94-47. 
 208 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18966–68. 
 209 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 210 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Taxing Convertible Debt: A Layman’s Perspective, 56 
SMU L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2003); Jeff Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 
399, 447 (2003) (arguing that because convertible debt serves an important financial 
signaling function and the impact of tax changes would be hard to predict, the best 
course is to do nothing).   
[B]ecause convertible debt has a fixed maturity date, a fixed minimum 
return equal to or greater than its issue price, and affords its holders 
creditors’ remedies, convertible debt satisfies the formal criteria of in-
debtedness.  It is therefore taxed under the same regimes as apply to 
senior nonconvertible bonds—not the regimes applicable to equity. . . .  
Kleinbard, supra, at 467–68.  Assorted Code provisions treat convertible securities as 
equity in order to buttress the provisions’ roles apart from the conventional debt ver-
sus equity arena.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) (convertible securities consi-
dered outstanding stock in determining personal holding company status); id. 
§ 305(d)(2) (“shareholder” includes a holder of stock rights or convertible securi-
ties).  The S corporation rules dictate a strict safe harbor test that eschews converti-
bility, but the purpose is to patrol the one-class-of-stock requirement, which is a dif-
ferent regime involving a different set of considerations.  See generally id. § 1361(c)(5) 
(S corporation straight debt safe harbor).   
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matter due to taxpayer use of multiple entity structures.
211
  Finally, 
there are international tax and competitiveness consequences of the 
structures that also must be considered.
212
 
A fair and effective response to those larger issues is beyond the 
scope of a doctrinal reworking of the debt classification test.  That 
conclusion prompted this Article’s earlier introductory statements 
that an arm’s length third-party lender test is not a complete solution 
to the classification issues of public corporations’ capital infusions. 
There has been no shortage of proposals for addressing the debt 
classification issue in the context of public corporations.  The Clinton 
administration, most notably, proposed partial legislative remedies 
that were not adopted.
213
  Other proposals range from doctrinal fixes 
for  § 385
214
 and calls from practitioners for more administrative di-
rection from the Service
215
 to broader approaches, such as supplant-
 
 211 In an announcement issued on the same day as Notice 94-47, the Service ques-
tioned the debt treatment of a structure in which the corporation issued preferred 
stock to a related partnership which then issued promissory notes to investors.  See 
I.R.S. Notice 94-48, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  The current multiple-entity structures, however, 
generally avoid this approach and instead have the related entity issue the equity-like 
instruments.  See, e.g., DAVID C. GARLOCK ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT 
INSTRUMENTS 1033–38 (5th ed. 2006) (describing multi-entity structures); GEORGE 
MUNDSTOCK, A FINANCE APPROACH TO ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 248–49 (2d. ed. 
2006) (describing accounting consolidation rules for special purpose borrowing enti-
ties); Humphreys, supra note 14, at 1217–27 (describing the use of stacked and side-
by-side entity structures).   
 212 See, e.g., Humphreys, supra note 14, at 1227–33 (comparing the treatment of 
debt by other countries); Andriy Krahmal, International Hybrid Instruments: Jurisdiction 
Dependent Characterization, 5 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 98 (2005).  
 213 See, e.g., James S. Eustice, “Debt-Like” Equity & “Equity-Like” Debt: Treasury’s Anti-
Hybrid Proposals, 71 TAX NOTES 1657 (1996) (discussing proposals to deny interest 
deduction for long-maturity debt and some hybrids, as well as limit the original issue 
discount deduction until the discount was paid); Humphreys, supra note 14, at 1149–
53 (discussing the 1990s proposed changes). 
 214 See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity 
Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (1985) (proposing that debt 
instruments be limited to unconditional promises to pay a sum certain in money on 
demand or on a specified date; hybrids would not qualify and the test would apply 
only to publicly held corporations); Gibson, supra note 33 (proposing a three-part 
analytical test referring to the corporation’s and shareholder’s objective intent to 
create a binding instrument, the shareholder’s objective intent to enforce payment 
rights, and the reasonableness of the shareholder’s repayment expectations).  
 215 See David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial 
Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 523–24 (1994) (“In the long run, however, I do not 
think Treasury can replace a practitioner’s judgment with a formula or list of factors.  
Far more useful will be the occasional published ruling explaining why a specific in-
strument is equity or debt.”); Humphreys, supra note 14, at 1246 (“The capital mar-
kets would benefit from clear guidance from the Treasury Department on the treat-
GAZUR (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:15 PM 
464 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:407 
 
ing the interest expense deduction with a cost of capital allowance
216
 
or other structural changes aimed at eliminating the double taxation 
of corporate profits or the debt/equity distinction.
217
  With continued 
 
ment of hybrid securities through published rulings that are focused on market de-
velopments and that set new markers for today’s new securities.”).  Of course, while 
simplicity in regulation is an attribute almost beyond reproach, the elimination of 
taxpayer flexibility may nevertheless be unwelcome.  See, e.g., Richard J. Kovach, The 
Janus-Like Nature of Treasury Regulations: Recent Promulgations Illustrate How Regulators 
Can Simplify as Well as Complicate Administration, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 101 (2002) 
(“The proposed regulations under I.R.C. § 385 failed because taxpayer representa-
tives overwhelmingly thought them both too complex and ungenerous.  Simplifica-
tion of abstruse concepts alone will not engender public acceptance if taxpayers be-
lieve they are substantially advantaged under existing vague standards by 
comparison.”).  The Service currently has placed the issue of “whether an interest in 
a corporation is to be treated as stock or indebtedness” as a general area in which 
rulings or determination letters will not be ordinarily issued as the determination is 
primarily one of fact.  See Rev. Proc. 2009-3, 2009-1 I.R.B. 107. 
 216 See, e.g., Channing E. Brackey, Choices of Capital: Reducing Their Impact on Tax-
payers and the Government, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 320 (1992) (discussing the Cost of 
Capital Allowance (COCA), which would replace the interest expense deduction 
with a deduction based on a percentage of the corporation’s total capital); Pratt, su-
pra note 164 (discussing several proposals but concluding that COCA is the most de-
sirable). 
 217 The competing proposals are well known and have been thoroughly discussed 
elsewhere.  They include a pass-through shareholder allocation method, an imputed 
shareholder credit for dividends, a shareholder dividend exclusion, a corporate divi-
dend deduction, and a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT).  See, e.g., 
SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at 151–65 (discussing the leading corporate integration pro-
posals); Humphreys, supra note 14, at 1233–37 (discussing the November 1, 2005 
Simplified Income Tax Plan and Growth and Investment Tax Plan proposed by the 
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform); Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the 
Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 
1461, 1506–15 (1993) (discussing a corporate full-loss offset in which the corporation 
would receive an income tax refund on account of net losses, accompanied by elimi-
nation of the interest deduction, corporate integration proposals, tax credits, and 
capital gains reductions); Pratt, supra note 164, at 1117–58 (discussing the leading 
proposals); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic 
Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431, 436–49 (1992) (discussing the American Law Institute’s 
proposal for the integration of individual and corporate income taxes).  Contra Her-
wig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. REV. 410, 
411 (2000) (accepting double taxation of corporate profits as a political reality and 
proposing that the interest expense deduction be abolished).   
     As a theoretical matter, there is no limit to the number of new in-
struments that can be created from the deconstruction and reconstruc-
tion of debt and equity instruments.  Thus, there is no theoretical limit 
to the number of new instruments that can be created in an attempt to 
exploit the inconsistency in the tax treatment of corporate debt and 
equity. . . .  Faced with such a reality, legislators and tax administrators 
might want to consider what they have in the past felt unable to con-
sider: whether, rather than trying to defend the line between debt and 
equity, they would simply be better served by abolishing it. . . . [A]s fi-
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evolution of financial instruments, it is questionable whether a doc-
trinal solution can be successful, and hopes for a fundamental reap-
praisal of the double taxation of corporate profits and the income tax 
distinctions between debt and equity are yet to be realized.  Neverthe-
less, in the interim,
218
 the proposed test does improve the 
debt/equity doctrine, at least as applied to shareholder loans. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes that an arm’s length third-party lender test 
be employed in the classification of shareholder loans as debt or eq-
uity. The proposed test would be implemented by the issuance of 
regulations.  Even if such regulations were not adopted, embracing 
this proposal would refine the courts’ approach to their multifactor 
tests.  In that regard, the proposed test would simplify and focus the 
approach to this issue, introducing more reliability and fairness of 
outcomes.  Happily, the test would not be that far removed from what 
is in substance already applied by many of the courts and the Service.  
By consistently focusing on the lending market’s receptiveness to a 
particular instrument, the proposed test would be an improvement 
over the current multifactor approach in terms of shareholder loans 
to closely held corporations, including subsidiaries, and the straight 
debt obligations of public corporations.  The proper treatment of 
more complex obligations of public corporations, however, is beyond 
the scope of this proposal. 
 
 
nancial innovation becomes cheaper and cheaper . . . the debt-equity 
distinction will be exploitable by taxpayers to such an extent that their 
choice of tax treatment will be effectively elective. 
Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-
Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2002).  Some proposals would sup-
plant the corporate income tax with a shareholder tax roughly based on annual 
mark-to-market determinations.  See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market 
and Pass-Through Corporate Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 266–67 (1995). 
 218 While predictions of the path of future tax legislation are unreliable and of lit-
tle value, I would expect that the future of corporate taxation will be much like the 
past two decades, allowing changes only on the margins.  One might expect that 
changes to reduce the nominal income tax rates on public corporations would be 
adopted far before any real effort to tackle the debt/equity divide.  The CBIT, for 
example, noted supra note 217, promised to resolve the debt/equity distinctions.  
But, transition rules, global capital flow implications, and short-term fiscal costs 
(which is a common factor in many of the reform proposals) are some of the ob-
stacles.  The “interim” may be a long time.  
